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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the impact of regulation and public policies on firm performance. Chapter 1, 
entitled “Political Contributions, Insider Trading, and CEO Compensation”, determines why CEOs from 
politically-connected firms receive higher pay compared to their non-politically connected peers. We 
investigate whether insider trading can explain high CEO pay. Using hand-collected firm-level lobbying 
data, we examine whether politically-connected CEOs engage in insider trading after sponsored bills are 
introduced and passed in the U.S. legislative bodies. Our results show that politically-connected CEOs 
commit insider trading, which yields higher compensation packages. In addition, we also find that lobbying 
benefits firm performance. Politically-connected firms receive more government contracts, which increases 
firm value. Overall, political contributions benefit both CEOs and shareholders. Chapter 2, entitled “The 
Impact of Incarceration on Firm Performance” conducts analyses on the impact of incarceration on firms 
based in the United States. Through time series Granger Causality Vector Autoregression (VAR) tests by 
state, we find that incarceration can influence labor markets measured by the state’s unemployment rate. 
We find that firms based in states with high incarceration underperform compared to firms based in states 
with low incarceration. This also holds true when examining prison reform data from the Pew Charitable 
Trust. Through differences in differences tests, we find that firms based in states with prison reform 
outperform firms based in states without prison reform. When controlling for firm and state macroeconomic 
factors, we find that increases in incarceration rates have a negative effect on firm performance. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Insider Trading, Political Lobbying, Firm Performance, Incarceration, Labor Markets 
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Chapter 1 
Political Contributions, Insider Trading, and CEO Compensation 
1 Introduction 
This study examines whether lobbying firms pay their CEOs more than firms that do not lobby and if these 
excess compensation costs are passed onto shareholders. Firms build political capital by operating lobbying 
offices in Washington D.C., being represented by Washington D.C. law firms, using political consulting 
firms, and using trade associations that represent the industry in which the firm is participating (Wilson, 
1990). The primary objective of corporate lobbying is to influence favorable legislation that will provide 
competitive advantages to firms. These advantages may include beneficial taxation policies, defensive trade 
restrictions, and industry barriers to entry (Unsal, Hassan, Zirek, 2016). Our study examines the relationship 
between firm lobbying, CEO compensation, CEO insider trading, and firms being awarded government 
contracts.  Our results indicate that firm lobbying leads to CEOs increasing their compensation through 
engaging in insider trading on political information and firm lobbying increasing government contracts and 
firm value. Brown, Huang, Siders, Lowry, and Shafer (2017) find a positive market reaction when CEOs 
visit the White House, which may stem from this occurrence being a positive signal that CEOs have inside 
access. In addition, CEOs that visit the White House receive more government contracts and are more privy 
to inside information, which reduces policy uncertainty. 
Previous studies find that corporate lobbying can benefit firms. Corporate Political Activity (CPA) which 
encompasses campaign contributions, lobbying, contributions to Political Actions Committees, the 
operation of government relations offices, and executive testimonies, is both related and acts as a vital 
determinant of firm performance (Lux, Crook, and Woehr, 2011). Political lobbying increases firm 
performance and hence shareholder value (Hillman et al., 1999; Chen, Parsley, and Yang, 2010). Links 
between firms and government have a positive effect on firm value (Hillman et al., 1999). In addition, 
lobbying firms can outperform their peers as well as the market average (Kim, 2008).  
Political connections can increase firm performance in the case of private firms in China when 
entrepreneurs are affiliated with the ruling political party (Li et al., 2008). Politically-connected CEOs may 
receive excess compensation for building political capital, with the anticipation that this investment will 
result in future benefits (Skaife, Veenman, and Werner, 2013). Politically connected firms can also increase 
firm value by receiving more government subsidies (Tao et al. (2017). Political lobbying is a means for 
building political connections and CEOs from firms that lobby are more likely to have higher compensation 
packages than their counterparts from firms that do not lobby (Unsal, Hassan, and Zirek, 2016).   
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Excess compensation may also stem from politically-connected CEOs engaging in insider trading from 
political information. Insider trading has created opportunities for firm insiders to profit off private 
information. This strategy may occur before public disclosures of positive information about the firm, such 
as before a firm securing a government contract, which increases firm performance and increases CEO 
compensation by profits made from insider trading. Political connections reduce the likelihood of firms 
being investigated and prosecuted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Correia, 2014). There 
are also may be a legal loophole hindering prosecution of insider trading by firm management (Henning, 
2013; Turner, 2015). This legal loophole may leave opportunities for CEOs to commit insider trading with 
limited or no legal repercussion. 
Firm management has the ability to craft legislation for bills that the U.S. member can pass through 
Congress. This communication is conducted through lobbyist firms and provides both parties with access 
to inside political information (Attkinson 2012:1; Mayer and Mujumdar, 2014).  The main purpose of firms 
utilizing lobbyists is to maintain political connections (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi, 2014). Attkinson 
states “A study by the watchdog group Public Citizen found that 43 percent of Members of Congress who 
left office between 1998 and mid-2005 went on to register as lobbyists.” This suggests that not only 
lobbyists have access to congress members, the lobbyists a large portion of lobbyists were members of 
Congress and have a deeper understanding of the inner workings of Congress from firsthand experience. 
We examine the number of CEO stock transactions after a bill is passed in the U.S. Congress and House of 
Representatives to determine if there is a presence of CEO insider trading and to find out whether these 
transactions lead to additional CEO compensation.  
We contribute to the current literature by further exploring whether corporate lobbying benefits firms or 
just CEOs by examining CEO insider trading and government contracts. We hypothesize that politically-
connected CEOs enjoy large compensation packages from trading on inside political information and that 
firms also benefit from political connections through government contract awards. Our study is motivated 
by Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008), who find that firms with politically-connected board members obtain 
more government contracts, and Skaife, Veenman, and Werner (2013) who find a correlation between 
corporate lobbying and CEO pay. We focus on political lobbying and whether it benefits the CEO, the firm, 
or both. Previous research examines the relation between political connections and government contracts, 
as well as political connections and management compensation. Bourveau, Coulomb, and Sangnier (2016) 
determine a link between political connections and insider trading in the French 2007 election and find that 
directors with connections to the President are more likely to engage in insider trading. Yet, there has not 
been a study specifically examining the relationship between political lobbying, insider trading, and CEO 
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compensation. In addition, we contribute to the existing literature by determining if the costs associated 
with political activity are passed onto shareholders. 
Our sample consists of 2,788 unique firms and 5,201 unique CEOs with 14 percent of the sample being 
lobbying firms. The sample includes a total of 2,554 bills introduced and passed in the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives. In our event study, we find that firm lobbying is related to positive changes in 
firm value measured by the firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Our results reflect that firms 
receive positive market reaction after the bill is introduced and passed in the U.S. legislative bodies. 
Additionally, we document that CEOs in our sample commit insider trading by purchasing their shares two 
weeks and one week before the introduction of the sponsored bill. We find that lobbying increases the total 
number of insider transactions, which eventually leads to higher CEO pay. Through multivariate analysis 
of the three variables for firm lobbying, we find evidence that firm lobbying increases total CEO 
compensation packages, including stock options. To our knowledge, the influence of insider trading on 
CEO pay through lobbying has not been examined. We fill this gap in the existing literature by empirically 
testing a) whether CEOs exploit lobbying information; b) whether lobbying increases the likelihood of 
insider trading; and finally, c) whether lobbying increases CEO pay. Our study represents an initial analysis 
of a new panel data set of lobbying and insider trading relation. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the existing literature relating to firm 
political contributions, the impact of insider trading, firm procurement of government contracts, and 
potential firm costs and benefits of CEO stock-based compensation. Section 3 presents the discussion of 
the data and methodology used to determine the presence of insider trading, CEO compensation, and 
government contract procurement. Section 4 confers about the results from the empirical tests, Section 5 
reviews the findings, and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature Review   
Several factors contribute to firms becoming politically active, which include the “institutional features of 
Congress,” the size of the firm, government contracts, and the level of industry concentration (Schuler, 
Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). Firms engage in political activism by PAC contributions, inside lobbyists (the 
number of lobbyists in their Washington D.C. office), and outside lobbyists (the number of outside lobbyists 
and political consultants). Firms that are in more concentrated industries may have less of a need for being 
politically-connected (Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1991). Outside directors that have political, 
government, or law backgrounds are more prevalent in certain industries where political experience is 
considered necessary, such as manufacturing (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). Hillman and Hitt (1999) found 
that a combination of political tactics by firms shapes the competitive environment. Firms can build political 
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influence by providing pertinent policy information to regulators in a more efficient and cost-effective 
manner than their industry competitors (Hansen, 1991).  
Whether or not firm lobbying is beneficial to firms has been studied extensively in the previous literature. 
In certain industries, such as the steel industry, firms that perceive to gain the most from political 
connections are the most active, despite the efficacy of determining the returns from political investment 
(Schuler, 1996).  This may also contribute to investments in higher CEO compensation for CEOs that are 
willing to pursue a corporate political strategy and implement firm lobbying.  
Firm lobbying can lead to reductions in a firm’s effective tax rates (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 
2009). Lobbying firms can outperform their peers as well as the market average (Kim, 2008). Research has 
also shown that firm lobbying can lead to higher financial performance (Chen, Parsley, and Yang, 2010). 
Corporate lobbying can also help fraudulent firms evade detection and provide the opportunity for managers 
to sell more of their shares (Yu and Yu 2012). Firm lobbying for trade protections in declining industries 
has been found to reward poor firm performance and hinder innovation. This finding has been countered, 
with investments from connected firms being shown to underperform investments made by firms without 
political connections (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). Yet, Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) find that 
political contributions are not an effective political capital investment. In contrast, Cooper, Gulen, and 
Ovtchinnikov (2010) find that firms that participate in the political contribution process result in higher 
rates of return. 
Firms may engage in lobbying efforts to benefit management and not necessarily the firm.  Skaife, 
Veenman, and Werner (2013) strengthen this argument by finding that corporate lobbying results in agency 
costs to be incurred by shareholders. Our results indicate that firm lobbying can benefit both the CEO and 
the firm, through acquiring additional government contracts and CEO insider trading.  
Firm insiders engage in insider trading to increase their personal wealth. Insider trading has been found to 
have a negative effect on firms and their stock price. Insider trading can also reduce firm value, by 
increasing the cost of equity (Masson and Madhavan, 1991). Prior research has seen that information 
asymmetries offer the firm CEO the opportunity for insider trading for personal gain (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 
2005). CEOs may consider insider trading as a means for increasing their compensation. CEO insider 
trading can create firm inefficiencies since the ability of CEOs to trade stock options contributes to firm 
agency problems (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994). CEOs also consider board positions upon retirement, 
which ties to the firm's stock returns. (Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999).  
Differing conclusions have been made about the benefits of management stock-based compensation, where 
this type of compensation used for solely the management’s benefit and not for the shareholder 
5 
 
(Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). Insiders have strategically chosen disclosure policies and 
when to implement stock trades to maximize their personal trading profits, when there is a low risk of 
litigation (Cheng and Lo, 2006). The timing of news disclosure is conducted for the CEOs' benefit. CEOs 
delay good news and hurry the disclosure of bad news to maximize their stock option compensation 
(Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Cheng and Lo, 2006). 
Insider trading has been seen to act as an indicator that insiders have private information, based on analysis 
of trading activity surrounding public announcements (Damodaran and Liu, 1993). Mimicking trading 
patterns by U.S. senators may beat the market (Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd, and Ziobrowski, 2004), which 
indicates that U.S. senators are earning abnormal trading profits through knowledge of inside information. 
Our results support this by showing a presence of CEO insider trading before bills pass. 
Given the lobbying and firm performance, we investigate how lobbying can benefit firms through 
government contracting. The level of a firm's political sensitivity impacts the level of scrutiny the 
government will put upon a firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Watts and Zimmerman (1990)'s political 
cost hypothesis states this. Government contracts are also of interest to firms, and political lobbying can 
obtain these contracts. However, regulators may already prefer to grant government contracts to domestic 
firms instead of foreign firms, because the profits of foreign firms do not contribute to domestic welfare 
(Branco, 1994). This preference for domestic firms may be the case, but political contributions can 
influence the selection of which domestic firms will receive the government contract. Firms that utilize 
government contracts span several industries and firms use political donations as well as political 
connections to strengthen their contractor bargaining power (Mills et al., 2012). Halchin (2006) overviews 
the federal procurement process and resources. 
3 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Lobbying and CEO Pay 
In our study, our motivation is to investigate if lobbying increases CEO wealth through insider trading. To 
test this, we first use lobbying expenditures and measure the relationship between compensation and 
political contributions to understand if the managers have private information by building political capital 
over the time. For this objective, we investigate our first hypothesis, the link between lobbying and CEO 
pay; 
H.1: All other things equal, lobbying CEOs have greater compensation packages compared to non-lobbying 
peers. (𝛽1>0) 
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CEO Pay = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators+∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (1) 
Our dependent variable is total CEO compensation and CEO compensation including options. We use three 
sets of lobbying indicators. Lobbydum is a binary variable and equal to one if the firm is lobbying in year 
t. Ln(lobbyexp) is the log transformation of total lobbying expenditure, and ln(totalbills) is the log 
transformation of the total number of bills lobbied at year t. We use firm-specific control variables and 
report our findings. 
3.2 CEO Pay and Insider Trading 
Since our motivation is to document the relationship between CEO pay and insider trading, we believe that 
managers exploit the political information to increase their wealth, therefore; we first expect that successful 
lobbying activity increases firm value in terms of cumulative abnormal returns before announcement date 
of bills introduced in the House and the Senate. 
H.2: All other things equal, lobbying firms obtain positive market reaction measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR);  
We hand collect sponsored bills and introduction dates in US legislative bodies from the Congressional 
Bills database for responsible lobbying firms in our sample. We next employ the event study CAPM method 
where; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return, 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is a risk-free return and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return of a selected market index (we 
use Value Weight index from CRSP). 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = ∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
We use different event windows around announcement dates, CAR [-t, +t], where we introduce the null 
hypothesis, which is that cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero; 
     𝐻𝑜: 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 0     
3.3 Lobbying and Insider Trading 
Bourveau, Coulomb, and Sangnier (2016) find that insider trading by politically-connected firm directors 
increases before and after the election. We examine this phenomenon in the United States exploring whether 
U.S. CEOs from lobbying firms increase their stock transactions once bills are introduced and become law. 
Our results confirm that lobbying firms are associated with positive CARs during the announcement dates 
when the sponsored bill is introduced and become law. Therefore, we hypothesize that CEOs from lobbying 
firms may engage in insider trading once they know the bill is introduced. 
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H.3: All other things equal, lobbying increases the number of insider transactions by CEOs before the 
sponsored bills are introduced and passed in US legislative bodies. (𝛽1>0) 
Transaction = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1 LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (3) 
Our dependent variable is Transaction, and we calculate it in two different ways. We first calculate the total 
number of insider transactions by lobbying CEOs two weeks before the bill is introduced in the US 
legislative bodies, and secondly, we calculate the total number CEO insider transactions one week before 
the introduction of the bill. We find that lobbying indicators lead to higher insider transactions when 
legislators vote on the bill. In that case, we believe that insider transactions two weeks and one week before 
the bill is introduced may increase the CEO pay over the long run since firms receive positive CARs 
surrounding the announcement date; 
3.4 Insider Trading and CEO Wealth 
We examine whether CEOs that engage in insider trading have higher compensation. Henderson (2011) 
finds that opportunities to trade on inside information can be used to supplement CEO compensation. We 
determine whether CEOs that engage in insider trading have higher CEO wealth.  
H.4: All other things equal, insider transaction increases CEO wealth; (𝛽1>0) 
CEO Pay = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1 Transaction +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (4) 
Our dependent variable is total CEO compensation and CEO compensation including options. We use the 
log transformation of the number of transactions two weeks and one week before the voted bill and 
document that insider trading increases CEO wealth. While we report that political engagement (i.e. 
lobbying) increases CEO wealth by managers exploiting the information (i.e. insider trading), we also test 
the firm performance of lobbying firms in our sample for potential agency cost problems.  
3.5 Lobbying and Government Contracts 
We believe that if lobbying increases CEO pay, however, fails to generate firm value; then it is the CEOs 
and not the shareholders that benefit from the lobbying activity. While the majority of finance literature 
(Chen, Parsley, and Yang, 2010; Kim, 2008; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999) points out that 
lobbying benefits firm performance, we measure the impact of lobbying by considering the impact of 
government contracting. Berrios (2006) finds that firms with inside contacts are given government 
contracts. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that politically connected firms are more likely to receive 
government investment. Goldman, Rochell, and So (2013) finds that firm lobbying results in an increase in 
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government contract awards after a U.S. House election where the firm is connected to the winning party. 
These political connections may be advantageous for firms in receiving more government contracts. 
Because of this, agency cost problems from firm lobbying may be mitigated by obtaining government 
contracts, due to the value added by government contracts, which offsets the costs incurred from politically-
connected CEO excess compensation. We expect that lobbying firms may gain easy access to government 
contracts by spending an excess amount of lobbying expenditures, therefore; 
H.5: All other things equal, lobbying increases the likelihood of gaining access to government contracts. 
(𝛽1>0) 
Contract=  𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (5) 
We calculate the government contract variable by a) if the firm has at least one government contract, and 
b) the total number of government contracts associated with the firm. We report that larger lobbying 
expenditures increase both the likelihood of receiving a government contract, as well as the total number 
of contracts. In this case, we believe that lobbying creates firm value. Just in 2014, government contracts 
totaled $447 billion, which shows the revenue potential that has in contributing to firm value if a firm can 
secure government contracts. 
3.6 Lobbying, Firm Value, and Government Contracts 
We now examine this further and look to determine whether firm value increases with firm lobbying. Firm 
lobbying increases the likelihood of being awarded government contracts (Goldman, Rochell, and So, 
2013). Elayan, Pukthuanthong, and Li (2004) find that government contract awards increase firm value. 
We hypothesize that lobbying firms receive more government contracts and these government contract 
awards increase firm value.  
H.6: All other things equal, lobbying increases the firm value through government contracting (𝛽1>0);  
FirmValue=  𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (6) 
We calculate the firm value in terms of long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for +12, +24, 
and +36 months after firm lobbying activity. We introduce lobbying indicators and an interaction term of 
lobbying multiplied by government contracting to understand if lobbying firms who are government 
contractors have better performance compared to non-lobbying firms. Lobbying benefits both CEOs and 
firms in different ways. Lobbying provides CEOs access to inside information, which they can use to profit 
from insider trading. Lobbying also provides additional access to government contracts (Hillman, 
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Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999) and government contracts increase firm value. We find that lobbying 
increases stock performance as well as shareholder wealth, which is consistent with our expectations. 
4 Methodology 
We measure lobbying activities in three ways. In Table 1, lobbydum is equal to 1 if the firm has lobbying 
activity in the given year, 0 otherwise. Second, we use a log transformation of the total amount of lobbying 
expenditures. Third, we calculate the number of bills a firm has lobbied. 14 percent of the firms included 
in the sample are lobbying firms, with the average amount of lobbying expenditures being greater than 
303,000 USD and the maximum expenditure amount being 45 million USD. 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
       
Panel A. Political characteristic at CEO level 
Total Lobbying Amount 26,131 303,082.20 1,498,310.00 0.00 0.00 45,500,000 
N. of Bills Lobbied 26,131 1.92 8.91 0.00 0.00 232.00 
Lobbydum 26,131 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 
   
 
   
Panel B. CEO and Insider Characteristic 
CEO Compensation 25,980 5,366.94 9,263.62 3,093.04 0.00 600,347 
CEO Compensation (Opt. Included) 26,078 6,157.78 27,918.14 2,689.29 0.00 3,300,331 
CEO Salary 26,131 731.71 405.38 680.00 0.00 8,100 
CEO Bonus 26,131 500.59 1,594.71 0.00 0.00 76,951 
CEO Cash 26,131 1,232.30 1,730.54 861.35 0.00 77,926 
CEO Stock Awards 15,470 1,857.24 3,289.17 803.56 -7230.19 131,940 
CEO Option Awards 15,470 1,125.00 2,872.81 267.40 -725.28 90,693 
CEO Non-Equity Incentive 15,470 1,019.85 1,733.51 513.04 -299.62 46,259 
%Insider CEO 26,131 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Insider Transaction - One Week 26,131 0.03 0.99 0.00 0.00 62.00 
Insider Transaction - Two Weeks 26,131 0.14 9.93 0.00 0.00 1,567.00 
       
Panel C. Control Variables 
Size 25,617 7.43 0.07 1.72 0.00 13.13 
ROA 25,968 0.02 0.03 0.55 -33.00 46.45 
Leverage 25,887 0.24 0.20 0.95 0.00 120.94 
HHI 25,980 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.01 1.00 
Tobin's Q 25,597 1.86 1.40 1.86 -0.99 147.35 
Sales Growth 25,821 0.14 0.07 2.54 -1.00 378.91 
 
      
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample, reporting the full sample summary statistics for measures of lobbying variables, 
and control variables, CEO pay and insider trading variables and firm-level control variables. Panel A summarizes lobbying 
characteristics of firms used in this study. Panel B lists calculated summary statistics of CEO pay and insider trading variables. Panel 
C lists calculated summary statistics for control. 
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In Table 2, we conduct a univariate analysis. Table 2 documents the difference between lobbying and non-
lobbying firms in terms of lobbying characteristics. We compare lobbying firm versus non-lobbying firms. 
In Panel A, we document that lobbying firms are larger in size and more profitable. On the other hand, non-
lobbying firms have higher Tobin's Q and sales growth, and the difference between lobbying and non-
lobbying firms is statistically significant, which provides additional support for this positive relationship 
between lobbying and firm performance, as seen in Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010). Positive relations 
between political connections have also been found in Germany (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010). 
Table 2 
Univariate Test 
       
       
Variable N 
Lobby  
[1] 
N 
Non-lobby 
 [2] 
Difference 
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
Panel A. Firm Characteristic 
 
 
 
   
Ln(Size) 2,485 9.17 23,132 7.19 1.98 [52.60]*** 
ROA 2,485 0.04 23,132 0.03 0.01 [2.60]** 
BookLeverage 2,485 0.25 23,132 0.24 0.01 [0.60] 
Herfindahl Index 2,485 0.21 23,132 0.22 -0.01 [-0.46] 
Tobin's Q 2,485 1.67 23,132 1.80 -0.13 [4.79]*** 
Sales Growth 2,485 0.07 23,132 0.15 -0.08 [-2.65]*** 
              
Table 2 reports the univariate analysis between our sample firms. In column (1), we define lobbying group if the firm is defined as a lobbyist 
in our sample. In column (2), non-lobby refers to firms with no lobbying engagement. In column (1)-(2), we report the differences in means of 
given variables and T-test results. In Panel A, we compare sample means based on lobbying activity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
5 Data  
a) Firm Data and CEO Characteristics 
We use COMPUSTAT database to identify the publicly traded firms in our study. We calculate firm-
specific variables from COMPUSTAT database. We then use ExecuComp database and merge it with 
COMPUSTAT to obtain CEO characteristics along with compensation variables. Our sample begins in 
2000 and ends in 2014. 
b) Stock Returns  
We use CRSP daily returns for the event study on market reaction. We also obtain CRSP monthly returns 
for calculating the buy-and-hold abnormal returns where the Value Weighted Index is the benchmark.  
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c) Insider Trading Data 
We collect insider trading data from Form 4 reported by the U.S. Securities Exchange and Commission 
(SEC)1. The SEC filings include detailed insiders (i.e., officers, directors, and shareholders who own more 
than 10% of ownership) transactions at the personal level.  
d) Lobbying Data 
Lobbying data is collected from Center for Responsible Politics (CRP)2 and merged with COMPUSTAT 
database to identify the publicly traded firms. The CRP database includes lobbying expenditure and bills 
which are sponsored by firms in our sample. In addition to CRP database, we also use Congressional Bill 
database3 to track the full history of bills (including introduction days at US legislative bodies) lobbied by 
firms in our sample.  
e) Government Contracts 
We hand collect the government contracting data by using Federal Procurement Data System4 and match it 
with publicly traded firms in our sample to identify the number of government contracts that firms obtain 
in a given year.  
6 Findings 
6.1 CEO compensation packages of lobbying and non-lobbying CEOs      
In Table 3, we divide our sample into lobbying firms versus non-lobbying firms and find that CEOs from 
lobbying firms have larger compensation packages measured in all forms. CEOs from lobbying firms have 
higher cash salary bonuses, stock awards, option awards, and overall total compensation in comparison to 
their non-lobbying peers and the differences are statistically significant. Firms may pay higher 
compensation to attract and maintain politically-engaged CEOs (Huilonga, Minb, Yapinga, and 
Lianshenga, 2010). Shareholders value management engaging in lobbying activities on their behalf (Hill, 
Kelly, Lockhart, and Ness (2013). We conduct a multivariate analysis to explore this further by measuring 
the relation between firm lobbying and CEO pay. 
                                                          
1 We also cross-check the validity of our data with one reported in following websites (http://insidertrading.org/ or 
http://openinsider.com/)  
2 www.opensecrets.org/lobbying   
3 http://www.congressionalbills.org/   
4 https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/ 
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Table 3 
Lobbying and CEO Compensation: Univariate Analysis 
Variable N Lobby [1] N Non-lobby [2] 
Difference  
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
Cash 2,515 1,442.53 23,616 969.09 473.44 [12.89]*** 
Salary 2,515 1,056.60 23,616 726.32 330.28 [33.89]*** 
Bonus 2,515 385.85 23,616 242.76 143.09 [4.18]**** 
Stock Award 2,149 3,703.88 13,321 1,559.32 2,144.56 [22.72]*** 
Option Award 2,149 2,145.55 13,321 960.36 1,185.19 [16.80]*** 
Non-Equity Incentive Plan 2,149 2,014.10 13,321 859.45 1,154.65 [21.16]*** 
Total Compensation 2,513 9,589.14 23,467 4,595.88 4,993.26 [29.43]*** 
Total Compensation (Inc. Options) 2,515 11,310.73 23,563 5,985.06 5,325.67 [12.43]*** 
Table 3 reports the univariate analysis between lobbying firms our sample firms. In column (1), we define lobbying group if the firm is defined as a 
lobbyist in our sample. In column (2), non-lobby refers to firms with no lobbying engagement. In column (1)-(2), we report the differences in means 
of given variables and T-test results. We compare sample means based on lobbying activity and CEO pay characteristics. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4 reflects the results from investigating if lobbying leads to higher compensation packages. We use 
two measures for compensation and define them as total compensation and total compensation including 
options. We use the same lobbying indicators and find that CEOs from lobbying firms do have higher 
compensation packages compared to their non-lobbying peers. Additionally, our results indicate that total 
lobbying expenditures and the total number of bills lobbied increase CEO pay. 5 
There is a positive relationship between total CEO compensation and lobbying expenditure, with this excess 
compensation leading to agency costs (Skaife, Veenman, and Werner, 2013). We believe that lobbying 
leads to higher CEO pay. This excess CEO pay comes from profits made from insider trading. Because of 
this, excess compensation may not be associated with agency costs. We try to explain this through empirical 
tests of firm performance and other channels of CEO pay resulting from insider trading.
                                                          
5 We also find that lobbying increases cash salary bonuses and other CEO pay packages, but to conserve space, we 
only report the total compensation packages.  
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Table 4     
Lobbying and CEO Compensation: Multivariate Analysis 
Dependent Variable 
Ln(Total 
Comp)t+1 
Ln(Total 
Comp)t+1 
Ln(Total 
Comp)t+1 
Ln(Total Comp 
Opt. Inc)t+1 
Ln(Total Comp 
Opt. Inc)t+1 
Ln(Total Comp 
Opt. Inc)t+1 
Sample       
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.100 
  0.095   
 [0.001]***   [0.001]***   
Ln(LobExp)t 
 0.035   0.036  
  [0.012]**   [0.001]***  
Ln(Total Bill)t   0.055   0.047 
   [0.045]***   [0.035]*** 
Ln(Size)t 0.409 0.406 0.411 0.396 0.393 0.399 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt -0.122 -0.119 -0.125 -0.045 -0.042 -0.049 
 [0.021]** [0.025]** [0.019]** [0.602] [0.627] [0.572] 
BookLeveraget 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.406 0.404 0.405 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt -0.035 -0.037 -0.034 -0.035 -0.037 -0.034 
 [0.678] [0.662] [0.685] [0.678] [0.661] [0.690] 
Tobin's Qt -0.107 -0.106 -0.107 -0.097 -0.096 -0.098 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Sales Growtht 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.278] [0.278] [0.285] [0.064]* [0.065]* [0.067]* 
Constant 5.261 5.270 5.247 5.215 5.231 5.197 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year 
Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,546 2,546 2,546 
N 24,344 24,344 24,344 21,996 21,996 21,996 
R2 38% 38% 38% 39% 39% 39% 
Table 4 exhibits the relationship between CEO compensation and lobbying for our sample firms. In column (1) to (3), our dependent variable is CEO total 
compensation. In column (4) to (6), our dependent variable is CEO compensation including the option. Lobbydum is equal to one if the firm has lobbying activity, 
zero otherwise. Ln(LobExp) is the log transformation of lobbying expenditure at the firm level. Ln(Total Bill) is the log transformation of the total numbers of bill 
sponsored. Other control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary variables but omit the coefficients. 
Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
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6.2 Association between firm lobbying and firm performance 
Next, we try to explain CEO pay and firm performance and if lobbying benefits the firm. To determine if 
lobbying increases stock prices, we conduct an event study analysis and measure the market reaction when 
the sponsored bill is introduced in the U.S. legislative bodies. Table 5 reflects these results. In Panel A, we 
report several different event windows when the bill is introduced. We find that lobbying firms receive 
positive market reaction when the bill successfully overcomes legal procedures. In addition, we find that 
market reaction is positive and significant for lobbying firms once the sponsored bill becomes law. The 
passing of a bill may be a positive market signal that indicates the effectiveness of a firm’s political 
connections. Also, firms lobby Congress to push bills which provide these firms competitive advantages. 
These competitive advantages, such as beneficial tax rates and deregulation, can increase firm value. For 
instance, on December 5, 2016, the Senate passed a bill that boots biomedical research and speeds Federal 
Drug Administration approvals. This bill greatly benefits pharmaceutical companies, who have contributed 
substantial political donations to Congressional campaigns.6 
Table 5    
Event Study: Bill Introduced   
Panel A. Short-Term Event Study 
Date CAR T-Test Prob. 
[0,+1] 1.00% 17.96 [0.001]*** 
[0,+2] 1.00% 14.59 [0.001]*** 
[0,+3] 0.89% 11.30 [0.001]*** 
[-1,+1] 1.00% 14.73 [0.001]*** 
[-2,+2] 1.05% 11.94 [0.001]*** 
[-3,+3] 0.96% 9.22 [0.001]*** 
[-4,+4] 0.84% 7.12 [0.001]*** 
Table 5 reports market responses to the sponsored bill being introduced and passed in the U.S legislative bodies. 
CAR refers to the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for lobbying firms when their sponsored bill is successful 
in legal procedures. In Panel A, we perform short-term event study where CAPM model is used to calculated CARs 
of event windows.  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return of a selected market index (CRSP value weight index). In Panel 
B, we use cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable and regress it on firm-level lobbying variable and 
other control variables. Std. errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
                                                          
6 Hughes, S., & Burton, T. M. (2016, December 05). Senate Clears Path for Bill to Speed FDA Drug Approvals. 
Retrieved January 25, 2017, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-clears-path-for-bill-to-speed-fda-drug-
approvals-1480981609 
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In Panel B of Table 5, we measure the market reaction in a multivariate analysis by regressing cumulative 
abnormal returns on lobbying expenditures. We find that increases in lobbying expenditure increase the 
cumulative abnormal returns, controlling for firm-specific characteristics. Our findings suggest that greater 
lobbying expenditure leads to greater market reaction for the firms in our sample. Positive market reactions 
occur when politically-connected individuals are nominated to a firm’s board of directors, which shows 
that markets value a firm’s political connections (Goldman, Rochell, and So, 2008). Bills being introduced 
and passed in the U.S. legislative bodies may also be a positive signal to the market that the firm’s political 
capital is increasing. These findings are in line with Chen, Parsley, and Yang, (2010), who found a positive 
relation between lobbying expenditures and firm financial performance by examining the relation between 
current lobbying and future performance, lobbying to change in financial performance and the first-
differenced equation of the first measure.  
Table 5: Panel B. Lobbying and Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Dependent Variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[0,+1] 
Sample    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(LobExp)t 0.112 0.223 0.236 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(Size)t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt -0.047 -0.046 -0.017 
 
[0.221] [0.445] [0.441] 
BookLeveraget 0.006 0.013 0.003 
 [0.415] [0.139] [0.671] 
HHIt 0.002 -0.002 -0.010 
 
[0.526] [0.593] [0.039]** 
Tobin's Qt 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
[0.001]*** [0.116] [0.506] 
Sales Growtht 0.011 0.028 0.024 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.179] [0.907] [0.975] 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 417 417 417 
N 2,505 2,505 2,505 
R2 3% 3% 3% 
 
Figure 1 represents the market reaction where we plot cumulative abnormal returns. We show that before 
the bill is introduced, lobbying firms obtain positive price movements two weeks before the bill 
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announcement date. The cumulative abnormal returns reach the highest point in event intervals of four or 
five days. We aim to investigate the positive price movement by insider trading in the following section. 
Figure 1 
Lobbying and CAR: Bill Introduced & Passed 
 
6.3 Association between lobbying and CEO stock transactions 
Given the positive market reaction, we investigate the presence of CEO insider trading. We examine if 
CEOs from lobbying firms exploit their inside information and engage in stock trades before the 
introductions of bills in the U.S. legislative bodies. CEOs can trade on inside information. An example of 
this is Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, who sold Wells Fargo shares for a profit of $26 million before 
settling a long-run investigation against Wells Fargo.7 Jagolinzer, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2016) 
find that politically connected insiders have information advantages and exploit them before government 
intervention announcements. Our hypothesis states that CEOs may commit insider trading before the 
introductions of the bills. Political connections may reduce the likelihood of CEOs being prosecuted for 
insider trading. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the number of insider transactions before the bill 
introduction date. Table 6 reflects the total number of CEO insider transactions that occur both two weeks 
                                                          
7 Kristof, K. (2016, October 14). CEO sold millions in Wells Fargo stock before fraud revelations. Retrieved 
January 25, 2017, from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-sold-millions-in-company-
stock-before-bank-fraud-revelations/ 
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and one week before the bill introduction date.  We measure the relation between lobbying and insider 
trading activity by regressing two weeks of the total number of stock transactions and one week of the total 
number of stock transactions made by CEOs before the introduction of the bill. Our results are presented in 
Table 6 where we measure the relationship between lobbying and insider transactions. 
Table 6     
Corporate Lobbying and Insider Trading     
Dependent Variable Ln(TwoWeeks) Ln(TwoWeeks) Ln(TwoWeeks) Ln(OneWeek) Ln(OneWeek) Ln(OneWeek) 
Sample       
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.136 
  0.075   
 [0.001]***   [0.001]***   
Ln(LobExp)t 
 0.036   0.019  
  [0.001]***   [0.001]***  
Ln(Total Bill)t 
  0.133   0.074 
   [0.001]***   [0.001]*** 
Ln(Size)t 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.298] [0.244] [0.700] [0.292] [0.242] [0.511] 
BookLeveraget -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 [0.278] [0.286] [0.124] [0.434] [0.394] [0.948] 
HHIt -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 
 [0.944] [0.974] [0.632] [0.279] [0.309] [0.147] 
Tobin's Qt 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.251] [0.273] [0.104] [0.456] [0.369] [0.877] 
Sales Growtht -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.924] [0.967] [0.431] [0.828] [0.795] [0.664] 
Constant -0.073 -0.080 -0.044 -0.041 -0.046 -0.024 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,763 
N 25,387 25,387 25,387 25,387 25,387 25,387 
R2 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Table 6 exhibits the relationship between insider transaction and lobbying for our sample firms. In column (1) to (3), our dependent variable is log transformation of the total number of insider 
transactions by CEOs two weeks before the bill is introduced. In column (4) to (6), our dependent variable is log transformation of the total number of insider transaction by CEOs one week 
before the bill is introduced. Lobbydum is equal to one if the firm has lobbying activity, zero otherwise. Ln(LobExp) is the log transformation of lobbying expenditure at the firm level. Ln(Total 
Bill) is the log transformation of the total number of bill sponsored. Other control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary 
variables but omit the coefficients. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Our results reflect that lobbying firms do have more insider trading activity in those two weeks and one-
week time periods. Thus, our findings confirm that lobbying increases CEO insider trading activity where 
managers are more likely to exploit inside information. We believe that lobbying increases insider trading 
activity, because legislation that is beneficial to the firm is being passed, which will be a positive signal to 
the market and CEOs engage in insider trading to profit from this information. 
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6.4 Association between CEO insider transactions and CEO wealth 
CEO political networks can have an impact on their compensation (Aslan and Grinstein, 2011).  We 
examine this further by determining whether CEO insider trading leads to higher CEO wealth. Insider 
trading gives the CEO an opportunity to make substantial profits, and this may contribute to CEO wealth. 
Firms who restrict insider trading pay executives more than firms who do not restrict insider trading. This 
indicates that opportunities for CEO insider trading can be used as part of CEO compensation packages 
(Henderson, 2011; Roulstone, 2003). We examine whether insider trading can explain CEO pay and benefit 
CEOs. We test for insider trading by comparing insider CEOs to non-insider CEOs and then measure CEO 
wealth. We define the group as an insider if the CEO of the firm has an insider transaction at least two 
weeks before the bill is introduced and non-insider refers to firms with no insider transaction at CEO level. 
Our univariate results are presented in Table 7. We find that CEOs who commit insider trading before the 
bill introduction date have greater cash, salary, bonus, and overall total compensation packages compared 
to CEOs who have no insider trading activity. Profits made from insider trading activity may boost CEO 
compensation and hence CEO wealth. These results confirm our earlier findings that CEOs with private 
political information may benefit from insider trading and the difference is statistically significant. CEOs 
may have larger compensation packages compared to their non-lobbying peers from the additional 
investment by firms for CEOs to gain political capital that will influence legislation and benefit the firm 
(Skaife, Veenman, and Werner, 2013). CEO pay may also be larger primarily from the portfolio 
optimization and trading profits made from inside political information (Henderson, 2011). 
Table 7 
Insider Trading and CEO Compensation 
Variable N 
Insider  
[1] 
N 
Non-insider  
[2] 
Difference  
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
Cash 375 1,759.93 25,756 1,017.03 742.90 [5.74]*** 
Salary 375 1,117.31 25,756 763.70 353.62 [15.44]*** 
Bonus 375 642.62 25,756 253.34 389.28 [3.06]*** 
Stock Award 363 3,878.49 15,107 1,808.67 2,069.82 [6.95]*** 
Option Award 363 2,504.32 15,107 1,091.86 1,412.46 [8.43]*** 
Non-Equity Incentive Plan 363 2,112.64 15,107 993.59 1,119.05 [8.47]*** 
Total Compensation 375 10,522.36 25,605 5,162.32 5,360.04 [12.78]*** 
Total Compensation (Inc. Options) 375 13,911.32 25,703 6,549.93 7,361.39 [8.10]*** 
Table 7 reports the univariate analysis between insider firms our sample firms. In column (1), we define insider group if the CEO of the firms 
have insider transaction at least two weeks before the bill is introduced. In column (2), non-insider refers to firms with zero insider transaction 
at CEO level. In column (1)-(2), we report the differences in means of given variables and T-test results. We compare sample means based on 
insider activity and CEO pay characteristics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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We also test the effect of insider trading on CEO pay, we also conduct a multivariate test and report our 
findings in Table VIII, with the dependent variable as total CEO pay and the total CEO pay including 
options.   
We regress CEO on insider trading characteristics and in Column 1 and 2, we find that the total number of 
transactions two weeks and the total number of transactions one week before the bill introduction date 
increases the total CEO pay. Similarly, in Column 3 and 4, we find that insider trading actions increase total 
compensation, including options8. These results may reveal the fact that insider trading increases the CEO 
wealth in our sample and is important to understand the benefit of political capital. This finding is relevant 
to understanding the motivations behind CEOs’ decisions on firm lobbying policy. 
Table 8   
Insider Trading and CEO Compensation   
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp)t+1 Ln(Total Comp)t+1 Ln(Total Comp Opt. Inc)t+1 Ln(Total Comp Opt. Inc)t+1 
Sample     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(TwoWeeks) 0.091  0.149  
 [0.001]***  [0.001]***  
Ln(OneWeek)  0.034  0.039 
 
 [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
Ln(Size)t 0.375 0.385 0.613 0.451 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt 0.112 0.113 0.183 0.133 
 [0.019]** [0.024]** [0.039]** [0.019]** 
BookLeveraget 0.125 0.128 0.204 0.151 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt -0.032 -0.035 -0.052 -0.041 
 [0.620] [0.120] [0.321] [0.113] 
Tobin's Qt -0.098 -0.100 -0.160 -0.118 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Sales Growtht 0.255 0.263 0.417 0.309 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant 4.827 4.992 7.892 5.859 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,634 2,634 2,546 2,546 
N 24,344 24,344 21,996 21,996 
R2 38% 38% 39% 39% 
Table 8 exhibits the relationship between insider transaction and CEO pay for our sample firms. In column (1) to (2), our dependent variable total 
CEO compensation. In column (3) to (4), our dependent variable is total CEO compensation including options. Ln(TwoWeeks) is the log 
transformation of the total number of CEO transactions two weeks before the lobbying bill is introduced and passed. Ln(OneWeek) is the log 
transformation of the total number of CEO transactions one week before the lobbying bill is introduced and passed. Other control variables are 
calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary variables but omit the coefficients. Std. Errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
                                                          
8 Our results do not change when we include other pay packages, such as CEO bonus, cash, and 
salary. 
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We also test the effect of insider trading on CEO pay, by examining a cross-sectional analysis. We create a 
sub-sample and only keep the firms that have insider trading activity reported. We report our findings in 
Table 9. In Table 9, our cross-sectional analysis documents that the greater number of insider trading leads 
to higher CEO pay. This result is compelling due to CEOs from lobbying firms enjoying greater 
compensation packages not only for engaging in lobbying but also from committing insider trading activity. 
Higher equity incentives are linked to higher executive total pay (Denis and Xu, 2013). 
 
Table 9   
Insider Trading and CEO Pay: Cross-Sectional Analysis   
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp)t+1 Ln(Total Comp)t+1 
Ln(Total Comp Opt. 
Inc)t+1 
Ln(Total Comp Opt. 
Inc)t+1 
Sample     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(TwoWeeks) 0.101  0.036  
 
[0.001]***  [0.001]***  
Ln(OneWeek)  0.016  0.087 
 
 [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
Ln(Size)t 0.412 0.183 0.149 0.993 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt -0.123 -0.054 -0.045 -0.292 
 
[0.021]** [0.011]** [0.001]*** [0.061]* 
BookLeveraget 0.138 0.061 0.050 0.332 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt -0.035 -0.016 -0.013 -0.089 
 
[0.684] [0.298] [0.248] 1.619 
Tobin's Qt -0.108 -0.048 -0.039 -0.259 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Sales Growtht 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
 
[0.280] [0.125] [0.101] [0.679] 
Constant 5.309 2.377 1.925 12.890 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 440 440 440 440 
N 2,982 2,982 2,982 2,982 
R2 26% 26% 26% 26% 
Table 9 exhibits the cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between insider transaction and CEO pay for our sample firms. In column (1) to 
(2), our dependent variable total CEO compensation. In column (3) to (4), our dependent variable is total CEO compensation including options. 
Ln(TwoWeeks) is the log transformation of the total number of CEO transaction two weeks before the lobbying bill is introduced and passed. 
Ln(OneWeek) is the log transformation of the total number of CEO transaction one week before the lobbying bill is introduced and passed. Other 
control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary variables but omit the coefficients. 
Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
21 
 
6.5 Association between lobbying and procurement of government contracts 
Our primary concern is that lobbying may increase CEO wealth, but may have no effect (or reduce) firm 
value. Previous studies find that lobbying does not benefit firms (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). In this case, 
if lobbying does not create wealth for firms, then it is only CEOs, not the shareholders who enjoy the 
political spending. This would lead to agency costs, which may stem from the firms compensating CEOs 
for being politically engaged in expectation of future regulatory benefits (Skaife, Veenman, and Werner, 
2013). To test the effect of lobbying on firm performance, we gather government contracting data and 
measure whether lobbying increases access to receiving government contracts. Access to government 
contracts can increase firm value. 
Table 10     
Corporate Lobbying and Government Contract     
Dependent Variable Contractt+1 Contractt+1 Contractt+1 
Ln(Total 
Contract)t+1 
Ln(Total 
Contract)t+1 
Ln(Total 
Contract)t+1 
Sample       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lobbydumt 1.085 
  1.119   
 [0.001]***   [0.001]***   
Ln(LobExp)t 
 0.397   0.335  
  [0.001]***   [0.001]***  
Ln(Total Bill)t 
  0.802   1.180 
   [0.001]***   [0.001]*** 
Ln(Size)t 0.450 0.419 0.437 0.127 0.121 0.084 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt 0.237 0.247 0.233 -0.021 -0.022 -0.013 
 [0.573] [0.565] [0.571] [0.268] [0.256] [0.287] 
BookLeveraget -0.357 -0.392 -0.319 0.094 0.089 0.076 
 [0.317] [0.278] [0.366] [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt 0.681 0.674 0.648 0.631 0.618 0.592 
 [0.045]** [0.051]* [0.058]* [0.056]* [0.063]* [0.054]* 
Tobin's Qt -0.411 -0.400 -0.394 -0.732 -0.788 -0.719 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Sales Growtht -0.155 -0.157 -0.169 -0.081 -0.078 -0.066 
 [0.276] [0.274] [0.225] [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant -4.740 -4.579 -4.614 -0.812 -0.778 -0.499 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 
N 25,112 25,112 25,112 25,112 25,112 25,112 
R2 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 
Table 10 exhibits the relationship between obtaining government contract and lobbying for our sample firms. In column (1) to (3), our dependent variable is Contract which is equal 
to one if firm earns at least one government contract, zero otherwise. In column (4) to (6), our dependent variable is log transformation of the total number of contract earned by 
firms. Lobbydum is equal to one if the firm has lobbying activity, zero otherwise. Ln(LobExp) is the log transformation of lobbying expenditure at the firm level. Ln(Total Bill) is 
the log transformation of the total number of bill sponsored. Other control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary 
variables but omit the coefficients. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.
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We regress government contracting indicators on firm-level lobbying activities and find that lobbying 
increases the likelihood of receiving government contracts. These results are in Table 10. Furthermore, we 
find that lobbying also increases the total number of contracts granted to firms by government officials. We 
propose that lobbying may build political capital which could provide easier access to government granted 
contracts. Political lobbying can influence the amount of government contracts a firm receives (Do, Lee, 
and Nguyen, 2015; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013). To test the effect of government contracting and 
lobbying, we measure the firm performance followed by lobbying activity.  
6.6 Association between government contracts and firm value 
Lobbying benefits firms through legislation that may provide competitive advantages for firms.  This 
includes government contracts, where political lobbying influences the selection of which firm is awarded 
the government contract. This practice is common for firms that rely on government contracts and is 
considered a type of market strategy (Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). This process of political 
connections increasing government contract awards and hence firm value is found at the national level in 
Goldman, Rocholl, So (2013) and state level in Do, Lee, and Nguyen (2015). 
In Table 11, we examine the relationship between the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
lobbying activity. We calculate +12, +24, and +36 months of buy-and-hold abnormal returns and test 
whether lobbying maximizes shareholder wealth. The results in Column 1 indicate that lobbying firms have 
better stock performance compared to non-lobbying peers. In addition, the interaction term of lobbying 
multiplied by government contracting is significant and positive. This result indicates that lobbying firms 
who obtain government contracts have higher stock returns and that the coefficient is statistically 
significant. Our results are similar for +24 and +36 months of abnormal returns reported in Column 2 and 
3. These results may reveal that lobbying does not only benefit CEO wealth but also increases the firm 
value, which mitigates the agency problem. Overall, our findings may build the understanding of the 
importance of political information, as well as political engagement, at the firm and CEO level. Government 
contracts can be very lucrative, totaling over $6.27 trillion from 2000 to 2014 and receiving these contracts 
can thereby benefit firms and increase firm value.9 
 
                                                          
9 Annual Review of Government Contracting [Review]. (2014). Bloomberg Government. Retrieved January 23, 
2017, from http://www.ncmahq.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/pdfs/exec15---ncma-annual-
review-of-government-contracting-2015-edition 
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Table 11    
Corporate Lobbying and Stock Returns     
Sample All  
Dependent Variable BHAR-12 BHAR-24 BHAR-36 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.039 0.054 0.072 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lobbydum*GovContt 0.043 0.083 0.074 
 [0.028]** [0.042]** [0.033]** 
GovContt -0.011 -0.038 -0.044 
 [0.466] [0.184] [0.333] 
Ln(Size)t -0.032 -0.066 -0.093 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt -0.205 -0.403 -0.483 
 [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.066]* 
BookLeveraget 0.077 0.176 0.298 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt -0.032 -0.059 -0.081 
 [0.216] [0.299] [0.356] 
Tobin's Qt 0.004 0.003 0.014 
 [0.474] [0.789] [0.444] 
Sales Growtht 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.018]** [0.028]** [0.032]** 
Constant 0.220 0.591 0.819 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,516 2,430 2,318 
N 22,679 21,682 19,271 
R2 5% 6% 5% 
Table 11 exhibits the relationship between obtaining a government contract, lobbying and firm performance for our sample 
firms. In column (1) to (3), our dependent variable is buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated for +12,+24, and +36 months 
period where benchmark index is CRSP Value Weighted portfolio. Lobbydum is equal to one if the firm has lobbying activity, 
zero otherwise. GovCont is a binary variable and equal to one if firm earns at least one government contract, zero otherwise. 
Lobbydum*GovCont is an interaction term where Lobbydum is multiplied by GovCont. Other control variables are 
calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary variables but omit the coefficients. 
Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
For final robustness of our results, we conduct propensity score matching (PSM) and report our findings in 
Table XII. In Panel A, we document the descriptive statistics of our matched sample for the quality of the 
PSM. Treatment groups refer to lobbying firms, while control group refers to non-lobbying firms. We show 
that there is no difference between our new sample, specifically in terms of firm size, and use it to conduct 
multivariate tests. In Panel B and Panel C, we confirm our initial findings; lobbying leads to greater CEO 
compensation, respectively. The positive relationship between lobbying and insider trading remain same in 
Panel D, where lobbying increases the number of insider transactions two weeks before the bill is 
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introduced. The increased number of transaction eventually benefits the CEO wealth in Panel E; we find 
that greater insider trading yields to higher CEO pay. 
Table 12 
Propensity Score Matching   
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Matched Sample 
Variable 
Treatment   
(Lawsuit) 
[1] 
Control 
(Non-Lawsuit) 
[2] 
%Bias T-statistics P-values 
 N=2,485  N=2,485  
   
Ln(Size) 9.041 9.049 -0.50 -0.20 0.839 
ROA 0.047 0.039 3.00 1.50 0.134 
Book Leverage 0.251 0.259 -1.00 -1.58 0.115 
Herfindahl Index 0.227 0.228 -0.40 -0.18 0.861 
Tobin's Q 1.711 1.724 -0.80 -0.54 0.590 
Sales Growth 0.082 0.095 -0.70 -1.93 0.054* 
            
 
Panel B. Dependent 
Variable 
Ln(Total Comp)t+1 
Sample    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.012   
 [0.001]***   
Ln(LobExp)t  0.335  
 
 [0.062]*  
Ln(Total Bill)t   0.478 
      [0.022]** 
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 4,970 4,970 4,970 
R2 12% 12% 12% 
    
Panel C. Dependent 
Variable 
Ln(Total Comp Opt. Inc)t+1 
Sample    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.901   
 [0.001]***   
Ln(LobExp)t  0.556  
 
 [0.029]*  
Ln(Total Bill)t   0.899 
      [0.041]** 
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 4,970 4,970 4,970 
R2 12% 12% 12% 
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Panel D. Dependent 
Variable 
Ln(TwoWeeks) Ln(TwoWeeks) Ln(TwoWeeks) 
Sample    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.779   
 [0.001]***   
Ln(LobExp)t  0.513  
 
 [0.001]***  
Ln(Total Bill)t   0.889 
 
  [0.001]*** 
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 4,970 4,970 4,970 
R2 11% 11% 11% 
    
Panel E. Dependent 
Variable 
Ln(Total Comp)t+1 Ln(Total Comp)t+1 Ln(Total Comp Opt. Inc)t+1 
Sample    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(TwoWeeks) 0.091  0.149 
 [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
Ln(OneWeek)  0.034  
 
 [0.001]***  
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 4,970 4,970 4,970 
R2 11% 11% 11% 
Table 12 exhibits the propensity score matching results to obtain the matched sample in the study. In Panel A, we document the descriptive statistics 
for the matched sample. In Panel B, we use the matched sample where our dependent variable is total compensation. In Panel C, we utilize the 
matched sample where out dependent variable is log transformation of CEO salary including options. In Panel D, we use the matched sample, and 
our dependent variable is two weeks of insider transaction by CEOs. In Panel E, we use the matched sample, and our dependent variables are log 
transformation of CEO compensation and log transformation of CEO compensation including options, respectively. Other control variables are 
calculated from COMPUSTAT. We add period (year) binary variables and industry binary variables but omit the coefficients. Std. Errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
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7 Conclusion 
In this study, our motivation is to determine why politically-connected CEOs are paid more than their non-
politically-connected rivals and whether this excess compensation leads to agency costs. We try to explain 
this by determining whether CEOs from politically-active firms are paid more than their peers that are not 
politically active, whether firm lobbying impacts firm performance, whether politically-connected CEOs 
engage in insider trading, and whether politically-connected CEOs receive higher compensation packages 
from engaging in insider trading. Our results reflect that politically-connected CEOs have higher 
compensation packages compared to their peers. This may stem from CEOs using political capital as a 
means of negotiation for higher compensation (Henderson, 2011). We also conjecture that politically-
connected firms do not suffer from agency costs from this excess CEO compensation due to increases in 
firm value from government contracts awards granted from being politically-connected.  
First, we find that lobbying firms receive positive market reaction during the announcement dates of a 
successful lobbying activity through our event study. We find that firms receive positive cumulative 
abnormal returns and the results are statistically significant. This may provide a market signal that the firm 
is receiving a return on its investment in political capital. Investors may expect profits from political 
connections stemming from conflicts of interests, such as informational advantages from government 
contracts (Luechinger and Moser, 2014). In our findings, we document that lobbying increases the insider 
transactions enacted by CEOs. Our results contribute to understanding why building political capital may 
help CEOs exploit firm-level information.   
Subsequently, we test whether firm lobbying increases the number of CEO insider transactions before the 
sponsored bills are introduced and passed in the US legislative bodies and if insider transactions increase 
CEO wealth. This is determined by examining lobbying expenditures to measure the relation between CEO 
compensation and political connections. Our results indicate that firm lobbying increases CEO wealth by 
insider trading. Our findings suggest that politically-connected CEOs enjoy greater compensation packages 
while insider transactions increase the CEO wealth as well as the total CEO pay. 
 Further, we test if lobbying benefits not only the CEOs but also the shareholders by examining the firm 
performance of the firms in our sample. We find that lobbying increases the likelihood of government 
contracting, which would yield positive abnormal returns. Our results show that firm value increases 
through the cumulative abnormal returns. The results highlight the importance of political connections, 
which benefits both CEO wealth and shareholder maximization.  
We conclude that political lobbying benefits both the CEO and shareholders in different ways. CEOs benefit 
from political lobbying by using inside political information from the introduction and passing of a 
sponsored bill to trade their stocks and obtain profits, which add to their compensation and wealth. Firms 
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benefit from procuring government contracts through political influence, which increases firm and hence 
shareholder value. Firms may also benefit from political activity through first mover advantage (Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008). Firms that have an idea that bills will be passed may have a head start on adapting to the 
legislation that will pass and thus can adapt faster than their competition. This is a topic that can be explored 
in the future. 
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Chapter 2 
The Impact of Incarceration on Firm Performance 
1 Introduction 
Discerning the impact of incarceration is a vital topic that has been widely studied by government agencies 
at both the state and national level and by research institutions. It has been vastly studied in the context of 
incarceration's economic and societal impact but has yet to be explored on its impact on businesses. To add 
to this extensive literature, we conduct a study focusing on the effect of incarceration on firm performance. 
We achieve this by studying whether firms based with low incarceration outperform firms based in states 
with high incarceration. We also examine whether firms based in states with prison reform outperform 
firms based in states without prison reform.  
The drastic increase in incarceration rates in the United States has been a topic of contention both politically 
and economically. Incarceration rates not only affect the people who are incarcerated but their families and 
the rest of the population as well. A study by Schmitt and Warner (2010) estimates that in 2008 the United 
States had between 12 and 14 million ex-offenders of working age. Federal and state policies have driven 
up prison populations (Raphael and Stoll, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates this drastic growth in the prison 
population in the United States from 1980 until 2015. This growth is primarily resulting from severe 
regulations imposed from mandatory minimum sentencing from the War on Drugs, Tough on Crime and 
Three Strikes laws (Raphael, 2014).) The United States incarcerates more of its citizens than any other 
advanced nation. Figure 2 reflects the incarceration rate the United States in comparison to other 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. This sweeping scale of 
incarceration is due to changes in the United States criminal justice system, not from changes in the level 
of criminal activity. The harsher sentencing of drug-related activity is one factor that has contributed to this 
extreme increase in incarceration. Western and Beckett (1999) have stated that “the criminal justice system 
is a U.S. labor-market institution.” 
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Figure 1: U.S. Prison Population from 1980-2015 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics; The Sentencing Project 
Figure 2: Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries 
 
Source: The Hamilton Project from the Brookings Institute, Glaze, and Heberman (2013), Walmsley (2013) 
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Not only does incarceration take people out of the labor force, but it also inhibits them from seeking work 
in certain industries after they have served their prison sentence. For example, Louisiana has a total of 389 
regulations restricting employment for people with a felony conviction, which is the highest of any state in 
the U.S. There are 300 regulations specifically for employment, 84 for occupational and professional 
licenses and certification, and 127 for business licenses and other property rights.10 The breakdown of the 
types of regulations that are barriers to employment for people with a felony conviction can be seen in 
Table 1. Louisiana is far from the only state to have passed employment restrictions against people with a 
felony conviction.  In fact, every state in the U.S. has at least 41 such restrictions, with an average of 123 
per state and this adds up to more than 6,000 mandatory state-level restrictions on employment for ex-
felons, with a further 112 such restrictions at the federal level (Fredericksen and Omli, 2016). 
Table 1: Regulations Restricting Employment for People with a Felony Conviction, By State 
  Restriction Category   
State Employment 
Occupational and Professional License 
and Certification 
Business License and Other 
Property Rights 
Total* 
AL 93 52 34 101 
AK 62 54 18 75 
AZ 113 88 45 133 
AR 115 56 33 120 
CA 94 94 67 171 
CO 81 41 22 97 
CT 51 30 23 57 
DE 114 83 37 129 
DC 72 35 21 75 
FL 147 102 67 168 
GA 86 59 48 147 
HI 37 16 19 41 
ID 128 57 43 145 
IL 143 77 122 258 
IN 138 102 43 160 
IA 50 28 37 74 
KS 80 28 40 1 
KY 135 72 22 141 
LA 300 84 127 389 
Table 1 reflects the regulations restricting employment for people with a felony conviction, by state by each category of 
restriction. Source: The Job Gap Prosperity Series Jobs After Jail: Ending the prison to poverty pipeline, American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Section *Since several regulations have restrictions in multiple restriction categories, the totals 
are not a reflection of the sum of the three categories. 
                                                          
10 Fredericksen, Allyson, and Desiree Omli. "Jobs After Jail: Ending the Prison to   Poverty Pipeline." The Job Gap 
Prosperity Series (2016): n. pg. Alliance for A Just Society. Web. 
https://jobgap2013.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/ajs_job_after_jail_report_final_pdf.pdf. Note that the number of 
regulations does not sum to 389, due to regulations overlapping in the listed categories. 
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Table 1 continued: Regulations Restricting Employment for People with a Felony Conviction, By State 
  Restriction Category   
State Employment 
Occupational and Professional 
License and Certification 
Business License and Other 
Property Rights 
Total* 
ME 79 28 25 88 
MD 87 40 35 109 
MA 61 26 32 70 
MI 64 34 32 94 
MN 62 34 33 78 
MS 89 49 41 104 
MO 100 48 31 110 
MT 57 35 19 61 
NE 100 62 37 112 
NV 57 28 25 88 
NH 222 128 95 240 
NJ 96 53 51 125 
NM 43 39 35 88 
NY 96 58 63 149 
NC 102 71 40 120 
ND 35 24 11 41 
OH 220 118 65 224 
OK 179 86 46 193 
OR 88 47 38 100 
PA 72 34 43 119 
RI 30 28 35 74 
SC 52 31 38 83 
SD 44 31 20 52 
TN 152 87 50 172 
TX 226 133 81 248 
UT 101 61 48 115 
VT 39 19 21 41 
VA 80 40 55 127 
WA 38 48 40 96 
WV 133 90 42 143 
WI 100 83 88 161 
WY 79 27 13 83 
Table 1 reflects the regulations restricting employment for people with a felony conviction, by state by each category of 
restriction. Source: The Job Gap Prosperity Series Jobs After Jail: Ending the prison to poverty pipeline, American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Section *Since several regulations have restrictions in multiple restriction categories, the 
totals are not a reflection of the sum of the three categories. 
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Former prisoners also face the stigma of having a criminal record and face a difficult time in obtaining 
consistent employment. Firms exhibit reluctance in hiring ex-offenders and as well as the limited actual 
hiring of former prisoners (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2003b). Criminal background checks are added to 
firm hiring practices as a way to extract a job applicant’s criminal record (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2004). 
Ex-offender difficulty in finding jobs can disrupt labor markets. Estimates by Schmitt and Warner (2010) 
indicate that ex-offenders decrease overall employment rates as much as 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points. This 
decrease reaches as much as 1.5 to 1.7 percentage points for male employment rates and as much as 6.1 to 
6.9 percentage points for less-educated men. This loss of employment impacts labor markets, firms, and 
the U.S. economy as a whole. In 2008, incarceration led to an estimated loss of $57 to $65 billion in the 
U.S. (Schmitt and Warner, 2010).  
Not only does incarceration lead to loss of worker productivity, but it is also one of the major costs that 
state governments must confront. Raphael (2011) states that incarceration has limited effect in preventing 
crimes and tend to be less serious forms of property crime and low-level drug offenses, and should be 
revaluated in relation the excessive monetary costs that are associated with incarceration. Corrections is the 
third highest expenditure that state governments face, ranked below Medicaid and education (Travis et al., 
2014). This drastic increase of government spending on corrections since 1980 is attributable mainly to the 
increase in the prison population. Henrichson and Delaney (2012) state that corrections expenditures have 
quadrupled over the past 20 years. In 2010, they surveyed and found that the 40 states that participated had 
a total taxpayer cost of imprisonment of $38.8 billion. Economy League of Greater Philadelphia (2011) 
find that helping find former prisoners employment can decrease recidivism and also results in an increase 
in earnings and tax revenues as well as reduce “costs on criminal justice agencies, social services, 
government cash transfers, and prevented victim costs." 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) find that state-specific macroeconomic indicators have the power to predict 
state portfolio returns. We hypothesize that incarceration is a state macroeconomic indicator that can 
influence firm performance. We contribute to the existing literature by conducting an initial study on the 
effect of incarceration on firm performance and exploring whether incarceration impacts labor markets 
through state-level unemployment rates. We also find that incarceration rates and unemployment rates are 
related through time series Granger Causality tests for each state. We conduct several tests to determine 
whether there is a relationship between incarceration and firm performance. We run a differences in 
differences test on firms based in states with and without prison reform and find that firms based in states 
with prison reform outperform firms based in states without prison reform. We conduct a differences in 
means test, grouping firms headquartered in high and low incarceration states. We find that there are 
differences in firm performance, and these differences are significant. Through pooled OLS and random 
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effects regressions, we test whether incarceration rates impact firm performance measured by return on 
assets. Our results indicate that incarceration negatively impacts firm performance. This is also confirmed 
through GMM estimation. 
2 Literature Review 
Schmitt and Warner (2010) use data from the Bureau of Justice to detail the dire economic consequences 
of pervasive incarceration throughout the U.S.  A felony conviction renders people much less employable, 
costing the U.S. economy between $57 and $65 billion annually.  This problem is an important one to 
attempt to remedy because if current trends continue, the portion of ex-felons in the working-age population 
will continue to increase, thereby causing even greater potential losses to the U.S. economy.   
The problem of excessive incarceration is especially pronounced in the Southern region of the United 
States.  As Bender (2002) finds, the huge growth in the private-prison industry has been concentrated in 
Southern states, aided by persistent lobbying and campaign contributions to both major political parties. 
Such political action by the private-prison industry has yielded an impressive influence on public policy 
regarding incarceration.  The private-prison industry enjoyed considerable growth in the late 1990s.  While 
the growth tapered off in the early 2000s, the industry has continued to seek out taxpayer-subsidized profits 
by turning its eye to mental hospitals and addiction-treatment centers.  The cozy relationship between the 
private-prison industry and state legislatures ensures that corrections companies “maintained their key role 
of housing prisoners and receiving taxpayer money.” 
Western et al. (2001) corroborate the stance that incarceration has a negative impact on labor force 
participation and lifetime earnings.  Moreover, they find that the negative impact is weighed 
disproportionately on low-skill minority males.  This negative impact on the economy is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, as the incarceration rate remained relatively stable from 1900-1970 before exploding more 
than fourfold between 1970-1999.  Additionally, the earning penalty that prisoners face can range from 10 
up to 30 percent. Incarceration can become the turning point for young men that leads to the decline in their 
earnings mobility (Western, 2002). Western (2002) goes on to state that, “the U.S. penal system has grown 
beyond disciplining the deviant few, to imposing a systemic influence on broad patterns of social 
inequality.” 
More recently, Blanks (2014) writes in the Washington Post that excessive incarceration has exacerbated 
the negative effects of the Great Recession.  People with criminal records have a much harder time finding 
employment.  In certain jurisdictions, ex-offenders are banned outright from jobs in certain industries.  The 
stigma against ex-offenders has resulted in more than half of ex-offenders being unemployed a year after 
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release.  The difficulties ex-offenders face reintegrating into society “perpetuate a cycle of poverty and 
incarceration for hundreds of thousands of Americans and their families” (Blanks, 2014). This results in a 
decline of communities that suffer from incarceration and re-entry into communities (Morenoff and 
Harding, 2014). Worse yet, the negative impact of incarceration is disproportionately levied geographically, 
socio-economically, and racially.  Aizer and Doyle (2015) provide sobering evidence that the incarceration 
problem also applies to juveniles.  Juveniles who are incarcerated are more likely to drop out of high school 
and be incarcerated as adults.  Aizer and Doyle (2015) posit that easing the juvenile incarceration rate would 
increase human capital accumulation. 
The implications of the labor market on finance have been established by studies such as Benzoni et al. 
(2007).  Many studies have found a link between the returns to human capital and market returns. As labor 
income and stock returns are correlated, it stands to reason that depressed labor income would have negative 
consequences on the stock market.  One key reason for negative shocks to labor income is decreased labor 
market participation due to increased incarceration rates.  Hence, it is plain to see that incarceration is 
intimately tied to socioeconomic well-being through the mechanism of firm performance. Our paper 
confronts this issue and seeks to determine the impact of incarceration on labor markets and firm 
performance.   
3 Data and Methodology 
Our data encompasses a time span of 15 years from 1995 to 2011. We examine publicly-traded firms based 
in the United States. We obtain firm financial data from Compustat and firm stock data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). CRSP and Compustat data are merged using firm ticker and financial 
year. This merged dataset is then merged with the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) data by survey year 
and state. State macroeconomic data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Current population data, per capita personal income, and unemployment rate 
are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). As in Brushwood et al. (2016), Korniotis and Kumar 
(2013), Achary et al. (2014), and Dougal et al. (2015), we use the firm headquarters state, which is listed 
in Compustat, as a proxy for location. We have a total of 131,215 observations and 17,755 firms. Table 2 
includes the summary statistics for the incarceration variables, prison reform variables, firm control 
variables, and state macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics      
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Panel A. Incarceration Variables      
Log (Incarceration Rate) -9.134 -9.076 0.457 -10.352 -8.117 
Incarceration Rate 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.030 
Total Custody 63528.750 44232 55694.270 823 172298 
      
Panel B. Firm Control Variables      
Return on Assets 0.010 -3.36 418.110 -130077 1208 
Log (Debt) 3.445 3.758 3.201 -6.908 14.531 
Log (Size) 4.836 4.890 2.460 -11.043 14.414 
Tangible 0.227 0.1289456 0.247 0 1.667 
Dividend 0.365 0 0.481 0 1 
Research and Development 4.337 0.0459503 148.885 -218.737 25684.400 
Capital Expenditures 107.923 3.6 682.127 -401.609 33143 
Market to Book Ratio 23.756 1.495712 921.841 0.009 194537.700 
Collateral to Assets 0.296 0.0008976 11.271 0 1000 
      
Panel C. Macroeconomic Variables      
Log (Per Capita Income) 10.459 10.453 0.199 9.859 11.000 
Percentage change in GDP 0.044 0.045 0.029 -0.144 0.174 
Unemployment Rate 5.685 5.241667 1.983 2.300 13.783 
Log (Population) 19.723 19.75936 0.923 16.278 21.249 
      
Panel D. Indicator Variables      
Below Median 0.442 0 0.497 0 1 
Foreign Operations 0.574 1 0.494 0 1 
Retail Industry 0.051 0 0.221 0 1 
Number of States 0.236 0 0.425 0 1 
Table 2 reflects the summary statistics of the firm, state macroeconomic, and state incarceration variables for our sample. 
The variables used in the interaction variables to address endogeneity issues are Below Median, Foreign Operations, Retail 
Industry, and Number of States. 
 
3.1 The Impact of Incarceration on Unemployment Rates 
Western and Beckett (1999) find that in the long run, U.S. incarceration rates raises unemployment by 
reducing the job prospects of ex-convicts. The incarcerated prison population is heavily concentrated 
among the young and less educated, with the majority of criminal offenders being younger than 30 years 
of age. This is the vital time when individuals are entering the job market or pursuing education to 
participate in the job market. To explore whether incarceration impacts unemployment, we conduct a 
Granger Causality test through Vector Autoregression (VAR). 
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We use state-level labor force data obtained from the local area employment statistics of the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. We obtain the incarceration rate from the U.S. Department of Justice and determine the 
optimal lags through the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). Our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in incarceration rates causes an increase in the unemployment rate at the state-
level. 
For testing the VAR, we use the following equations: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑌𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the unemployment rate, and 𝑍𝑡 is the incarceration rate. We conduct this regression using these 
simultaneous equations to determine whether there is a relationship between the incarceration rate and the 
unemployment rate. We conduct the Granger Causality tests to establish the presence and direction of 
causation between incarceration rates and unemployment rates.  
3.2 The Impact of Prison Reform on Firm Performance 
We also want to see whether states passing prison reform can be impactful on firms. Figure 3 reflects the 
reduction in incarceration in states after prison reform. Because prison reform may lead to reducing 
incarceration, our next hypothesis examines the impact of states passing prison reform on firm performance, 
which is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: All other things equal, firms that are based in states with prison reform will experience 
higher firm performance as measured by Return on Assets. 
We conduct a differences in differences test using prison reform initiatives passed by state governments. 
We use prison reform data collected by the Pew Charitable Trust11 to segment which states have passed 
prison reform and which have not. Differences in differences (DiD) tests are a type of fixed effects 
estimation and are used to estimate the treatment effects through a comparison of the pre- and post-treatment 
difference in the reaction of a treatment and control group.  
 
                                                          
11 The Pew Charitable Trusts, “33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment,” 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ 
research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/11/33-states-reform-criminal-justice-policies-through-justice-reinvestment 
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Figure 3: U.S. State Prison Incarceration Rates 
Pre- and Post- State Prison Reform from 2006-2011 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of prison reform policies on state incarceration rates for selected states 
from 2006 until 2011. Prison reform data was referenced from the Pew Charitable Trust; incarceration 
rates were created using the total number of prisoners incarcerated from incarceration data from U.S. 
Department of Justice Statistics database, the state population is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).  
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The main objective of this study is to determine if there is a relationship between incarceration rates and 
firm performance. To do this, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms that are based in states with high incarceration rates will have lower firm performance 
(measured by Return on Assets) compared to firms based in states with low incarceration. 
We conduct differences in means tests, segmenting data by firms located in states with low and high 
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incarceration rate above the 25th percentile and states with high incarceration if they have an incarceration 
rate above the 75th percentile.  
To expand upon Hypothesis 3 and include both firm-control and state-level macroeconomic control 
variables, we conduct multiple panel data regressions. This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: All other things equal, incarceration rate has a negative impact on firm performance as 
measured by Return on Assets. 
Since we are using panel data, we conduct a random effects and pooled OLS regression, clustered by firm 
through firm gvkey using the following equation:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝐶𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔(%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑂𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the return on assets, used as the dependent proxy variable measuring firm performance 
calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm 
of firm total debt. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the firm's closing stock 
price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the firm’s total net property plant and 
equipment divided by total assets.  𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm 
issues dividends, 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of a firm’s collateral to assets calculated by the sum of 
property, plant, and equipment and inventory divided by total assets. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 
the incarceration rate calculated by the state’s aggregate prisoners in custody divided by the state 
population. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝐶𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of state per capita personal income. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 is 
the natural logarithm of the percentage change in state gross domestic product. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑂𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of the state population. 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the annual state unemployment rate. 
3.4 Limitations and addressing endogeneity issues 
Firms can have multiple subsidiaries, and these can be dispersed throughout several states, which can create 
issues with determining whether state-level incarceration has an impact on the firm's performance. To 
address this issue, we follow Brushwood et al. (2016), using four main measures of assessing the likelihood 
of a firm having geographically dispersed operations: 
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 Measure 1: an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s book value of assets is below the median 
value within its 3-digit SIC industry, 0 otherwise. The rationale for this is that smaller firms tend to have 
localized operations.  
 Measure 2: whether a firm has foreign operations. This takes the value of 1 if a firm reports having foreign 
operations zero, and 0 otherwise.  
 Measure 3: an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the retail industry and 0 otherwise. 
The rationale for this is that retailers tend to have more diversified geographic operations.  
Measure 4: the number of different states mentioned in a firm’s 10-K filing.  
To find Measures 2 and 4 we use subsidiary data provided by Dyreng and Markle (2016). 
To conduct further robustness checks and address endogeneity, we conduct GMM estimation.  
4 Findings 
4.1 Incarceration Rates and Distribution of Firms by State 
Incarceration rates and the distribution of firms by state can be seen in Table 3. In 2000, Minnesota had the 
lowest incarceration rate, with .04 percent of the state population being incarcerated. At 2.6 percent, 
Delaware had the highest incarceration rate in 2000. In both 2005 and 2010, Massachusetts had the lowest 
incarceration rate, at .04 percent in 2005 and .03 percent in 2010. Delaware again had the highest 
incarceration rate at 2.6 percent in 2005 and 1.7 percent in 2010. These incarceration rates may be impacted 
by states shifting prison populations to jails to accommodate the rise in state prisoners. In 2000, there were 
only three firms headquartered in Alaska, which was the fewest of any U.S. state. Alaska had an 
incarceration rate of 1.4 percent. Conversely, in 2000 California had the most firms at 1585. California had 
an incarceration rate of 1.4 percent. This same pattern can be seen in 2005 with Alaska having four firms 
and an incarceration rate of 1.3 percent. California again had the highest number of firms at 1336 and an 
incarceration rate of 1.2 percent. In 2010, Alaska again had the fewest firms, 4, and an incarceration rate of 
1.1 percent. California had the most firms, 1315, with an incarceration rate of 1 percent. 
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Table 3: Incarceration Rates and the Distribution of Firms by State 
State 
Incarceration 
Rate 
2000 
No. 
firms  
2000 
Incarceration 
Rate 
2005 
No. firms  
2005 
Incarceration 
Rate 
2010 
No. firms  
2010 
AK 0.014 3 0.013 4 0.011 4 
AL 0.021 63 0.017 51 0.016 33 
AR 0.018 33 0.016 27 0.015 20 
AZ 0.019 121 0.015 102 0.016 91 
CA 0.014 1585 0.012 1336 0.010 1315 
CO 0.010 251 0.010 208 0.009 191 
CT 0.012 197 0.010 162 0.009 129 
DE 0.026 94 0.021 126 0.017 114 
FL 0.015 509 0.013 384 0.012 312 
GA 0.019 287 0.017 231 0.014 169 
HI 0.010 20 0.008 13 0.006 16 
IA 0.010 43 0.009 35 0.008 32 
ID 0.012 15 0.011 20 0.010 20 
IL 0.011 429 0.009 462 0.009 601 
IN 0.010 131 0.012 106 0.011 91 
KS 0.011 55 0.010 45 0.008 63 
KY 0.010 58 0.010 50 0.009 44 
LA 0.018 56 0.014 40 0.010 46 
MA 0.004 507 0.004 460 0.003 459 
MD 0.012 171 0.009 142 0.008 276 
ME 0.005 14 0.005 12 0.004 11 
MI 0.016 164 0.015 126 0.013 107 
MN 0.004 233 0.004 181 0.004 136 
MO 0.017 143 0.016 107 0.014 88 
MS 0.018 33 0.015 22 0.012 19 
MT 0.007 15 0.007 8 0.005 8 
NC 0.014 183 0.013 159 0.012 145 
ND 0.006 7 0.006 6 0.005 7 
NE 0.008 35 0.007 31 0.006 26 
NH 0.005 35 0.005 24 0.004 23 
NJ 0.007 421 0.006 355 0.005 270 
NM 0.007 16 0.007 10 0.006 5 
NV 0.015 122 0.012 110 0.012 116 
NY 0.011 941 0.008 867 0.006 940 
OH 0.013 307 0.012 235 0.012 196 
OK 0.018 71 0.015 69 0.013 70 
OR 0.010 88 0.011 61 0.010 49 
PA 0.010 405 0.009 356 0.009 338 
RI 0.011 28 0.009 24 0.007 17 
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SC 0.021 58 0.018 46 0.015 38 
SD 0.012 12 0.013 9 0.010 11 
TN 0.009 119 0.007 108 0.007 89 
TX 0.023 859 0.018 729 0.015 648 
UT 0.008 97 0.007 74 0.006 61 
VA 0.013 257 0.010 200 0.008 178 
VT 0.008 15 0.008 10 0.006 8 
WA 0.008 168 0.007 155 0.006 121 
WI 0.010 108 0.012 92 0.010 85 
WV 0.008 18 0.008 18 0.009 16 
WY 0.009 7 0.006 7 0.007 5 
Table 3 reflects the incarceration rate and number of firms for each state in the United States for the years 2000, 
2005, and 2010. The incarceration rate is the ratio of the total amount of prisoners under custody in each state 
over the state population for each of the given years.  
 
4.2 State Correction Expenditures Compared to Other Selected State Expenditures 
Table 4 reflects the regional and state level capital expenditures associated with corrections in 1996 and 
2001, expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars. There is an increase of 7,458,054,000 USD in total 
expenditures on corrections from 1996 to 2001. Regarding U.S. regions, in 1996, Southern states had the 
highest capital expenditures for corrections at 7,442,584,000 USD while the Midwest region had the lowest 
capital expenditures with 4,502,037,000 USD. In 2001, the Southern region again had the highest 
expenditures with 10,002,325,000 USD, while the lowest expenditures were found in the Northern region, 
with 6,056,762,000 USD. Corrections expenditures for the Southern region comprised 33.8 percent of total 
U.S. corrections expenditures in 1996 and 33.9 percent of total U.S. corrections expenditures in 2001. 
Table 4: Total, operating, and capital expenditures and operating costs per State inmate and per U.S. resident, fiscal years 1996 and 2001 
 1996 2001 
 Expenditures (1,000s of dollars) Annual operating costs Expenditures (1,000s of dollars) Annual operating costs 
Region and 
State Total Operating Capital 
Per 
inmate 
Prisoners 
under State 
authority on 
06/30/1996 Total Operating Capital 
Per 
inmate 
Prisoners 
under State 
authority 
on 
06/30/2001 
           
Total $22,033,214 $20,737,888  $1,295,326  $20,142  1,029,595 $29,491,268  $28,374,273  $1,116,995  $22,650  1,252,743 
           
Northeast $5,083,959 $4,690,704 $393,256 $28,996 161,773 $6,056,762  $5,712,994  $343,769  $33,037  172,925 
Connecticut 497838 475367 22471 31912 14896 523960 506905 17055 26856 18875 
Maine 51713 48206 3507 33711 1430 76479 75133 1346 44379 1693 
Massachusetts 309674 304483 5191 26002 11710 413071 404862 8209 37718 10734 
New 
Hampshire 42970 42429 541 20839 2036 62754 60279 2475 25949 2323 
New Jersey 839308 827115 12193 30773 26878 799560 768661 30899 27347 28108 
New York 2220586 1948752 271835 28426 68556 2807259 2547452 259807 36835 69158 
Pennsylvania 978769 902244 76525 28063 32151 1203219 1183668 19551 31900 37105 
Rhode Island 109596 108683 913 35739 3041 124333 121167 3165 38503 3147 
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Vermont 33505 33426 79 31094 1075 46128 44867 1261 25178 1782 
           
Midwest $4,502,037 $4,254,686 $247,351 $21,919 194,107 $6,327,346  $5,952,214  $375,132  $24,779  240,213 
Illinois 740423 732824 7599 19351 37870 1011311 996738 14573 21844 45629 
Indiana 338195 325700 12495 20188 16133 477628 449406 28222 21841 20576 
Iowa 146069 143774 2295 24286 5920 188391 186298 2093 22997 8101 
Kansas 170848 158454 12394 22242 7124 199843 182655 17189 21381 8543 
Michigan 1167610 1161142 6468 28067 41371 1582611 1573273 9338 32525 48371 
Minnesota 185983 184359 1624 37825 4874 253385 239953 13432 36836 6514 
Missouri 262787 249414 13373 12832 19437 436081 362429 73652 12867 28167 
Nebraska 69867 67904 1963 22271 3049 126857 99865 26992 25321 3944 
North Dakota 10749 10584 165 17154 617 26796 24219 2577 22425 1080 
Ohio 1014917 873584 141333 19613 44540 1277622 1201269 76354 26295 45684 
South Dakota 34152 33582 570 17787 1888 37529 37030 499 13853 2673 
Wisconsin 360439 313366 47073 27771 11284 709292 599080 110212 28622 20931 
           
Total $22,033,214 $20,737,888  $1,295,326  $20,142  1,029,595 $29,491,268  $28,374,273  $1,116,995  $22,650  1,252,743 
           
South $7,442,584 $6,990,526 $452,058 $15,338 455,756 $10,002,325  $9,750,580  $251,745  $16,479  563,818 
Alabama 168989 165760 3229 7987 20753 228871 221774 7097 8128 27286 
Arkansas 133729 124513 9216 13341 9333 199003 192611 6392 15619 12332 
Delaware 87961 87253 707 17987 4851 166327 162397 3930 22802 7122 
District of Col 213716 212148 1568 21296 9962 143700 143700 . . . 26670 5388 
Florida 1224933 1100655 124278 17327 63521 1484799 1453799 31000 20190 72007 
Georgia 560358 547490 12868 15933 34363 923505 900918 22586 19860 45363 
Kentucky 208706 198775 9931 16320 12180 288438 274404 14034 17818 15400 
Louisiana 316245 313463 2783 12304 25476 479260 459686 19573 12951 35494 
Maryland 520263 480880 39382 22247 21616 645620 632749 12872 26398 23970 
Mississippi 148852 143914 4938 11156 12900 266196 264503 1693 12795 20672 
North Carolina 756829 733775 23054 25303 28999 863892 840347 23545 26984 31142 
Oklahoma 198290 193567 4723 10601 18260 384060 377378 6682 16309 23139 
South Carolina 315539 277868 37671 13977 19880 405238 373249 31989 16762 22267 
Tennessee 350575 349177 1398 22904 15245 421807 421807 . . . 18206 23168 
Texas 1713935 1565214 148721 12215 128140 2315899 2270959 44940 13808 164465 
Virginia 476715 452358 24357 16306 27742 723767 699104 24663 22942 30473 
West Virginia 46949 43716 3233 17245 2535 61944 61194 750 14817 4130 
           
West $5,004,632 $4,801,972 $202,661 $22,032 217,959 $7,104,834  $6,958,485  $146,349  $25,231  275,787 
Alaska 116664 112350 4314 32415 3466 154650 154156 494 36730 4197 
Arizona 418094 409167 8927 19091 21433 618571 609910 8661 22476 27136 
California 3031047 2918845 112202 21385 136492 4166573 4107844 58729 25053 163965 
Colorado 249833 234503 15330 21020 11156 466551 435037 31514 25408 17122 
Hawaii 87417 83921 3496 23318 3599 117101 117101 . . . 21637 5412 
Idaho 56957 55017 1940 16277 3380 95494 92821 2673 16319 5688 
Montana 42448 41875 573 20782 2015 71994 71169 825 21898 3250 
Nevada 121960 119026 2934 15370 7744 182092 180834 1258 17572 10291 
New Mexico 125602 123892 1710 29491 4201 149077 148249 828 28035 5288 
Oregon 254330 253421 909 31837 7960 404255 399436 4819 36060 11077 
Utah 113394 111808 1585 32361 3455 133963 133683 281 24574 5440 
Washington 357862 311122 46740 26662 11669 488314 459814 28500 30168 15242 
Wyoming 29025 27024 2001 19456 1389 56199 48431 7768 28845 1679 
           
Total $22,033,214 $20,737,888  $1,295,326  $20,142  1,029,595 $29,491,268  $28,374,273  $1,116,995  $22,650  1,252,743 
           
South $7,442,584 $6,990,526 $452,058 $15,338 455,756 $10,002,325  $9,750,580  $251,745  $16,479  563,818 
Alabama 168989 165760 3229 7987 20753 228871 221774 7097 8128 27286 
Arkansas 133729 124513 9216 13341 9333 199003 192611 6392 15619 12332 
Delaware 87961 87253 707 17987 4851 166327 162397 3930 22802 7122 
District of Col 213716 212148 1568 21296 9962 143700 143700 . . . 26670 5388 
Florida 1224933 1100655 124278 17327 63521 1484799 1453799 31000 20190 72007 
Georgia 560358 547490 12868 15933 34363 923505 900918 22586 19860 45363 
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Kentucky 208706 198775 9931 16320 12180 288438 274404 14034 17818 15400 
Louisiana 316245 313463 2783 12304 25476 479260 459686 19573 12951 35494 
Maryland 520263 480880 39382 22247 21616 645620 632749 12872 26398 23970 
Mississippi 148852 143914 4938 11156 12900 266196 264503 1693 12795 20672 
North 
Carolina 756829 733775 23054 25303 28999 863892 840347 23545 26984 31142 
Oklahoma 198290 193567 4723 10601 18260 384060 377378 6682 16309 23139 
South 
Carolina 315539 277868 37671 13977 19880 405238 373249 31989 16762 22267 
Tennessee 350575 349177 1398 22904 15245 421807 421807 . . . 18206 23168 
Texas 1713935 1565214 148721 12215 128140 2315899 2270959 44940 13808 164465 
Virginia 476715 452358 24357 16306 27742 723767 699104 24663 22942 30473 
West Virginia 46949 43716 3233 17245 2535 61944 61194 750 14817 4130 
           
West $5,004,632 $4,801,972 $202,661 $22,032 217,959 $7,104,834  $6,958,485  $146,349  $25,231  275,787 
Alaska 116664 112350 4314 32415 3466 154650 154156 494 36730 4197 
Arizona 418094 409167 8927 19091 21433 618571 609910 8661 22476 27136 
California 3031047 2918845 112202 21385 136492 4166573 4107844 58729 25053 163965 
Colorado 249833 234503 15330 21020 11156 466551 435037 31514 25408 17122 
Hawaii 87417 83921 3496 23318 3599 117101 117101 . . . 21637 5412 
Idaho 56957 55017 1940 16277 3380 95494 92821 2673 16319 5688 
Montana 42448 41875 573 20782 2015 71994 71169 825 21898 3250 
Nevada 121960 119026 2934 15370 7744 182092 180834 1258 17572 10291 
New Mexico 125602 123892 1710 29491 4201 149077 148249 828 28035 5288 
Oregon 254330 253421 909 31837 7960 404255 399436 4819 36060 11077 
Utah 113394 111808 1585 32361 3455 133963 133683 281 24574 5440 
Washington 357862 311122 46740 26662 11669 488314 459814 28500 30168 15242 
Wyoming 29025 27024 2001 19456 1389 56199 48431 7768 28845 1679 
Table 4 reflects the total, operating, and capital expenditures and operating costs for each state inmate and U.S. resident for the fiscal years of 1996 and 2001 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics from the reports State Prison Expenditures, 1996 and State Prison Expenditures, 2001. The data sources are the FY 1996 
Survey of Government Finances, U.S. Census Bureau and FY 2001 Survey of Government Finances, U.S. Census Bureau. Note:  For the 1996 data, expenditures 
exclude adult community corrections, juvenile corrections, and probation and parole services. Inmate counts used to calculate operating expenditures per inmate 
were based on prisoners under the jurisdiction of State correctional authorities from June 30, 1995, to June 30, 1996.  See Methodology for details. Subtotals may 
not equal total due to rounding. For the 2001 data, forty-six States and the District of Columbia began their fiscal year in July and ended them in June. The 
exceptions were Alabama and Michigan—October to September; New York—April to March; and Texas—September to August. Subtotals may not equal total 
due to rounding. The following information is not reflected in the data: states have integrated jail-prison systems; the District of Columbia reported no capital 
outlays during FY 2001, a transition period during which its sentenced felons were being transferred to the Federal Bureau of Prisons; during FY 2001, Tennessee 
spent capital amounts from sources outside its Department of Correction; and Hawaii's Department of Public Safety, Corrections Division had nonrecurring 
expenditures which State budget officials excluded from the capital category.             
 
The annual per capita costs placed on state residents in terms of U.S. dollars in 2001 can be found in Table 
5. This table breaks down selected state expenditures in 5-year increments from 1986 until 2001. The total 
corrections expenditures per capita doubled from 1986 to 2001, increasing from $65 in 1986 to $134 in 
2001. The total prison expenditures more than doubled as well, increasing from $49 in 1986 to $104 in 
2001. Public welfare expenditures more than doubled, increasing from $425 in 1986 to $914 in 2001. This 
is not the case for education, which only increased by 56 percent from $842 to $1315. Healthcare costs 
increased less than total corrections and prison costs. The average percent change from 1986 to 2001 is the 
same for prison expenditures and public welfare expenditures, at 6.4 percent. These results indicate the 
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rising costs and funds that are allocated to total corrections and prisons. Ex-offenders also face obstacles to 
consistent employment and are subject to jobs with low wages, which can result in their family members 
being placed on public welfare. Addressing means reducing prison populations and helping prisoners to 
renter society and the labor market upon release can reduce this burden on state resident taxpayers and 
funds can be allocated more to health and education.   
Table 5: Annual per capita costs, in 2001 constant dollars, for selected State expenditures, 1986-2001 
  State expenditures as costs per resident 
Fiscal year 
Total 
corrections Prisons Health Education Public welfare 
Natural 
resources   
        
1986 $65  $49  $78  $842  $425  $44   
1991 98 76 109 998 632 52  
1996 119 91 141 1143 849 56  
2001 134 104 154 1315 914 61  
        
Average annual 
percent change, 
1986-2001* 6.2 6.4 5.8 4.2 6.4 3.3 % 
Table 5 reflects the annual per capita costs of corrections along with other selected state expenditures in terms of 2001 constant USD. The data 
is obtained from the following reports: State Prison Expenditures, 2001 NCJ  202949, U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of State Government 
Finances, 1986-2001 editions; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Estimates and Projections, 1986-1996; and unpublished data from 2001 
Current Population Estimates.  Bureau of Economic Analysis, chain-type price indexes for the gross domestic product, 1959-2002, in Economic 
Report of the President, Table B-7, February 2003. *Based on total expenditures. 
 
4.3 The Impact of Incarceration Rates on Unemployment Rates 
We conduct Granger Causality VAR tests on time series data for each state, as seen in Table 6. We derive 
the VAR results to conduct the Granger Causality tests. The results from the VAR tests show that in all 
fifty states, there is a significant relationship between incarceration and unemployment rates. The state with 
the weakest significance is Wyoming, with the results being significant at the 10% level. Seven of the fifty 
states have significant Granger Causality results indicating that incarceration rates affect unemployment 
rates: Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Nevada. Ten of the fifty states 
have significant Granger Causality results suggesting that unemployment rates affect incarceration rates: 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, North Dakota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and Wyoming.  
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Table 6: Time Series Granger Causality Tests by State 
    Vector autoregression 
chi2 from Granger Causality 
Wald tests 
    UR IR         
State No. lags UR   IR   UR   IR   UR   IR  
AK 1 0.65 *** -98.42  0  0.68 *** 0.12  0.07  
AL 1 0.82 *** 181.2  0  0.83 *** 0.13  0.32  
AR 2 0.66 *** 869.79 *** 0   0.9 *** 6.9 *** 1.86   
AZ 3 -0.84 * -1295.7  0  0.34 *** 1.3  1.17  
CA 2 0.46  -773.08  0  0.53 *** 0.61  0.7  
CO 2 0.46 * 1231.42 ** 0 *** 0.86 *** 5.06 ** 12.11 *** 
CT 1 0.95 *** 152.78  0  0.79 *** 0.24  2.25  
DE 1 0.86 *** 44.17  0  0.78 *** 0.05  1.39  
FL 4 -1 * -993.47  -9.81E-06  0.45 *** 0.27  0.07  
GA 3 1.32 ** 1718.72 *** 0 ** 0.35 *** 9.29 *** 4.76 ** 
HI 2 0.51 *** -2357.72 *** 0 *** 0.43 *** 16.57 *** 10.03 *** 
IA 4 0.25   1392.66 *** 0 *** 0.56 *** 14.78 *** 14.52 *** 
ID 4 -2.26 *** -2022.74 *** 0 *** 0.72 *** 12.332 *** 7.9 *** 
IL 2 0.57 ** 965.61   0 ** 0.72 *** 0.79   4.85 ** 
IN 4 0.3   4023.96 *** 0   0.88 *** 35.73 *** 1.37   
KS 2 0.49 * 455.84  0  0.74 *** 0.64  0.11  
KY 4 0.67 ** 5761.53 *** 0   0.02   38.04 *** 0.04   
LA 1 0.45 * -824.95  0  0.56 *** 1.42  1.67  
MA 2 0.45 * -4683.6   0 *** 0.37 *** 2.51   17.43 *** 
MD 3 -0.56 ** -4801.7 *** 0 ** 0.52 *** 17.56 *** 4.39 ** 
ME 1 0.89 *** 1951.41   0 *** 0.92 *** 2.56   7.37 *** 
MI 4 0.67 * 5571.41 *** 0 *** 0.24 ** 28.9 *** 9.78 *** 
MN 4 0.09   3912.21 *** 0 *** 0.91 *** 23.81 *** 10.3 *** 
MO 4 0.45   1355.97 *** 0 *** 0.46 *** 12.08 *** 18.86 *** 
MS 1 0.94 *** 833.2 * 0 ** 0.73 *** 3.55 * 5.34 ** 
MT 2 0.3   -2158.31 ** 0   -0.06   6.34 ** 0.13   
NC 1 0.9 *** 438.48  -5.50E-06  0.87 *** 0.6  0.19  
ND 1 0.73 *** 50.55   0 *** 0.93 *** 0.08   7.95 *** 
NE 1 0.68 *** 514.15 * -5.19E-06   0.95 *** 2.81 * 0.02   
NH 1 0.79 *** -238.93  0  0.67 *** 0.08  1.78  
NJ 1 0.63 *** -2915.46 *** 0.00E+00   0.86 *** 8.27 *** 0.35   
NM 3 -0.28   454.82   0 *** 0.03   0.19   11.44 *** 
NV 4 -0.42   7915.01 ** 0.00E+00   -0.57 *** 6.34 ** 0.56   
NY 4 -0.39 * -3054.74 *** 0 *** 0.43 ** 8.07 *** 25.96 *** 
OH 3 0.52   1453.64   0.00E+00 *** 0.39 *** 1.26   7.52 *** 
OK 1 0.7 *** -70.37  3.70E-06  0.82 *** 0.03  0.02  
OR 1 0.63 *** 689.14  0.00E+00  0.98 *** 1.96  1.33  
PA 2 0.49 * 470.61  0.00E+00  0.84 *** 0.96  0.81  
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RI 1 1.02 *** 1208.08   0.00E+00 *** 0.48 *** 2.58   7.7 *** 
SC 1 0.89 *** 126.83   0.00E+00 *** 0.82 *** 0.03   9.25 *** 
SD 3 -0.33   450.03 *** 0.00E+00 *** 0.8 *** 7.07 *** 9.29 *** 
TN 1 0.81 *** -1516.34  -2.12E-06  0.64 ** 2.14  0.02  
TX 4 -1.2 *** -684.23 *** 0.00E+00 ** 0.08   16.46 *** 5.12 ** 
UT 2 0.1  -580.98  0.00E+00  0.32 * 0.16  0.1  
VA 2 0.41  -152.3  0.00E+00  0.55 *** 0.05  1.19  
VT 4 0.13   2501.91 *** 0.00E+00 *** 0.14   9.51 *** 9 *** 
WA 4 -1.13 *** 870.11  -6.13E-06  0.49 *** 1.36  0.08  
WI 1 0.79 *** 304.83  0.00E+00  0.96 *** 1.81  0.64  
WV 3 0.61 * 1100.88  0.00E+00  0.93 *** 0.74  0.52  
WY 3 -0.16   -146.57   0.00E+00 * -0.24   0.02   2.89 * 
Table 6 reflects the results from the time series Granger Causality Tests for the incarceration and unemployment rates for each state in the U.S. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4 Prison Reform and Firm Performance 
Next, we explore if prison reform has an impact on firm performance by grouping firms that are based in 
states that have undergone prison reform as the treatment group and firms that are not based in states that 
have undergone prison reform as the untreated group. Through a difference in difference test, we find that 
firms based in states with prison reform outperform firms that are based in states without prison reform, 
with firm performance measured by return on assets. This result suggests that prison reform may increase 
firm performance. The results from the differences in differences test are reflected in Table 7 and the total 
prison reforms are listed in Table 8. In Table 9, we show the percentage change from the year before to 
the year after prison reform. As reflected in the table, 14 of the 19 states that passed prison reform had a 
reduction in their state incarceration rate a year after the prison reform was passed. This result suggests 
that prison reform was effective in reducing prison populations, which had a positive impact on firm 
performance for firms based in states that had prison reform. 
 
Table 7: Difference in Difference Tests 
Independent Variable: Return on Assets     
Variables Coefficient Robust Standard Error t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
No Prison Reform 1.42 1.44 0.98 0.33 -1.41 4.25 
Prison Reform 2.94** 1.40 2.10 0.04 0.20 5.67 
did3 -2.34 1.67 -1.40 0.16 -5.61 0.94 
_cons -3.49 1.39 -2.51 0.01 -6.22 -0.77 
Table 7 reflects the differences in differences tests on firms that are based in states with prison reform compared to firms that 
are based in states without prison reform. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Total Prison Reforms by state 
Year State Total Prison Reforms 
2007 TX 3 
2007 WV 4 
2007 KS 3 
2008 VT 4 
2008 PA 3 
2008 CT 2 
2008 RI 4 
2008 AZ 1 
2009 IL 5 
2009 WI 2 
2010 SC 19 
2010 NH 4 
2010 MI 7 
2011 KY 19 
2011 OH 13 
2011 AL 2 
2011 NC 12 
2011 AR 14 
2011 LA 12 
2012 GA 15 
2012 MO 6 
2012 DE 8 
2012 OK 4 
2012 HI 9 
2012 PA 6 
2013 OR 12 
2013 SD 14 
2013 KS 9 
2013 WV 11 
2014 ID 12 
2014 MS 19 
2015 UT 17 
2015 AL 17 
2015 NE 14 
2016 AK 21 
2016 MS 16 
Table 8 reflects the total number of prison reforms implemented by state governments for each 
corresponding state.  Data referenced from the Pew Charitable Trust. 
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Table 9: Total Prison Reforms by state 2007-2011 
Year State 
Total 
Prison 
Reforms 
IR one year 
before Prison 
Reform 
Year of 
Prison 
Reform 
IR one year 
after Prison 
Reform 
Percentage Change 
from year before to 
year after prison 
reform 
2007 TX 3 0.017 0.016 0.014 -0.148 
2007 WV 4 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.004 
2007 KS 3 0.009 0.008 0.007 -0.162 
2008 VT 4 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.091 
2008 PA 3 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.086 
2008 CT 2 0.010 0.009 0.009 -0.060 
2008 RI 4 0.009 0.008 0.008 -0.094 
2008 AZ 1 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.083 
2009 IL 5 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.094 
2009 WI 2 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.016 
2010 SC 19 0.016 0.015 0.014 -0.120 
2010 NH 4 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.240 
2010 MI 7 0.013 0.013 0.012 -0.135 
2011 KY 19 0.009 0.008 0.003 -0.677 
2011 OH 13 0.012 0.011 0.004 -0.660 
2011 AL 2 0.016 0.016 0.005 -0.663 
2011 NC 12 0.012 0.011 0.004 -0.677 
2011 AR 14 0.015 0.014 0.005 -0.686 
2011 LA 12 0.010 0.009 0.003 -0.642 
Table 9 reflects the total number of prison reforms implemented by state governments for each corresponding 
state.  The state incarceration data is created by using the total men and women in custody divided by the state 
population for each given year. Prison reform data referenced from the Pew Charitable Trust. Incarceration data 
is from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. State Population is references from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.   
 
4.5 High Versus Low Incarceration 
Next, we conduct differences in means tests on firm characteristics, placing firms that are based in states 
with high incarceration in one group and firms that are based in states with low incarceration in another. 
We consider a “Low Incarceration” state as one that has an incarceration rate below the 25th percentile and 
a “High Incarceration” state as one that has an incarceration rate above the 75th percentile. Our results, 
detailed in Table 10, indicate that there are significant differences in several firm-level control variables 
between firms in Low Incarceration states and those in High Incarceration states. These firm-level control 
variables are Return on Assets, Tangible, Dividend, Research and Development, Capital Expenditures, 
Log(Debt), and Log(Size). Return on Assets, our proxy variable for firm performance, indicates that 
incarceration negatively affects firm performance more for firms based in states with high incarceration 
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than firms based in states with low incarceration, and this result is significant. Also, firms that are based in 
states with low incarceration have less debt, are larger in size, issue fewer dividends, and invest in research 
and development more than firms that are based in states with high incarceration. 
Table 10: Two-sample T-tests with Unequal Variances by Level of Incarceration 
Variable Mean   Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Confidence Interval 
       
Return on Assets       
Group 0: Low Incarceration -0.91  0.199 20.25 -1.301 -0.52 
Group 1: High Incarceration -3.574  2.196 233.154 -7.879 0.73 
Combined -2.299  1.149 168.958 -4.552 -0.047 
Difference (0) – (1) 2.664 * 2.301  -1.845 7.173 
T-statistic 1.1579      
       
Tangible       
Group 0: Low Incarceration 0.176  0.002 0.198 0.172 0.180 
Group 1: High Incarceration 0.312  0.003 0.289 0.306 0.317 
Combined 0.246  0.002 0.258 0.243 0.250 
Difference (0) – (1) -0.136 *** 0.003  -0.143 -0.129 
T-statistic -39.731      
       
Dividend       
Group 0: Low Incarceration 0.282  0.004 0.450 0.274 0.289 
Group 1: High Incarceration 0.360  0.004 0.480 0.352 0.369 
Combined 0.321  0.003 0.467 0.315 0.326 
Difference (0) – (1) -0.079 *** 0.006  -0.090 -0.068 
T-statistic -13.7418      
       
R & D       
Group 0 3.371  0.751 59.420 1.899 4.843 
Group 1 1.660  0.659 42.755 0.369 2.952 
Combined 2.683  0.521 53.351 1.661 3.705 
Difference (0) – (1) 1.711 * 1.063  -0.373 3.795 
T-statistic 1.609      
       
Capital Expenditures       
Group 0: Low Incarceration 66.572  4.179 417.073 58.380 74.764 
Group 1: High Incarceration 111.084  4.880 497.588 101.517 120.650 
Combined 89.303  3.228 460.482 82.977 95.630 
Difference (0) – (1) -44.512 *** 6.449  -57.153 -31.871 
T-statistic -6.902      
       
Market to Book       
Group 0: Low Incarceration 12.02376  2.416 217.998 7.287 16.760 
Group 1: High Incarceration 10.30127  1.634 153.126 7.098 13.505 
Combined 11.12999  1.439 187.161 8.310 13.950 
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Difference (0) – (1) 1.722493  2.880  -3.922 7.367 
T-statistic 0.5981      
       
Collateral to Assets       
Group 0: Low Incarceration 0.223  0.103 10.367 0.022 0.424 
Group 1: High Incarceration 0.133  0.030 3.077 0.076 0.191 
Combined 0.177  0.052 7.545 0.075 0.279 
Difference (0) – (1) 0.089  0.104  -0.115 0.293 
T-statistic 0.859      
       
Log (Debt)       
Group 0 2.840  0.042042 3.231 2.758 2.923 
Group 1 3.510  0.037859 2.994 3.436 3.584 
Combined 3.185  0.028377 3.130 3.129 3.240 
Difference (0) – (1) -0.670 *** 0.056453  -0.781 -0.559 
T-statistic -11.867      
       
Log (Size)       
Group 0 4.831  0.021 2.299 4.790 4.873 
Group 1 4.670  0.023 2.384 4.626 4.714 
Combined 4.752  0.016 2.342 4.722 4.783 
Difference (0) – (1) 0.162 *** 0.031  0.101 0.223 
T-statistic 5.1979      
Table 10 reflects two-sample t-tests with unequal variances for firms based in states segmented by low and high incarceration. A “Low 
Incarceration” state is one that has an incarceration rate below the 25th percentile while a “High Incarceration” state is one that has an 
incarceration rate above the 75th percentile. Return on Assets is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Tangible 
is the firm’s total net property plant and equipment divided by total assets. Dividend is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm issues dividends, 0 otherwise. Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of firm total debt. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of firm size, measured 
by the firm's closing stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. R&D is calculated as research and development expenses 
divided by total sales. Capital Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by total assets. Market to Book is the sum of total 
liabilities, preferred stock/liquidating value, deferred taxes and investment tax credit, and price times common shares outstanding, over total 
assets. Collateral to Assets is the sum of the total net property, plant, and equipment and inventory divided by total assets. 
 
4.6 Incarceration Rates and Firm Performance 
We conduct a random effects and pooled OLS effects regression. Our dependent variable is firm 
performance, which is proxied by return on assets. We also include several firm-level and state 
macroeconomic control variables. We cluster the regressions by firm using the firm gvkey found in 
Compustat. The results from the pooled OLS regression can be found in Table 11. Our results indicate that 
incarceration rate has a negative effect on firm performance and this is significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 11        
Pooled OLS Regression clustered by firm (gvkey) and state 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets        
Variables Coef.   
Robust 
Standard Error z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log (Incarceration Rate) -0.352 ** 0.160 -2.2 0.028 -0.666 -0.039 
Log (Debt) -0.017  0.016 -1.04 0.298 -0.049 0.015 
Log (Size) 0.175 *** 0.040 4.39 0 0.097 0.253 
Tangible 0.227  0.286 0.79 0.428 -0.334 0.787 
Dividend -0.016  0.075 -0.22 0.829 -0.164 0.131 
Research and Development -0.001  0.001 -0.81 0.417 -0.002 0.001 
Capital Expenditures 0.000 *** 0.000 -2.66 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Market to Book Ratio -0.061 *** 0.023 -2.63 0.009 -0.107 -0.016 
Collateral to Assets -1.180 ** 0.568 -2.08 0.038 -2.294 -0.066 
Log (Per Capita Income) -1.325 ** 0.635 -2.09 0.037 -2.571 -0.079 
Percentage Change in State GDP 3.682 ** 1.730 2.13 0.033 0.290 7.075 
Unemployment Rate -0.019  0.032 -0.58 0.562 -0.082 0.044 
Log (Population) -0.023  0.075 -0.31 0.755 -0.170 0.123 
Below Median Book Value of Assets*Log (Incarceration Rate) 0.012  0.013 0.94 0.347 -0.013 0.038 
Foreign Operations*Log (Incarceration Rate) 0.012 * 0.007 1.74 0.083 -0.002 0.025 
Retail Industry*Log (Incarceration Rate) -0.044 *** 0.008 -5.71 0 -0.059 -0.029 
Number of States*Log (Incarceration Rate) -0.012 * 0.007 -1.65 0.099 -0.026 0.002 
Constant 10.134 ** 4.687 2.16 0.031 0.944 19.323 
Table 11 reflects the pooled OLS regression results clustered by firm and state. The dependent variable is the return on assets, the proxy variable for firm 
performance. The main independent variable is Log (Incarceration Rate). Firm control variables are Log (Debt), Log (Size), Tangible, Dividend, R & D, Capital 
Expenditures, Market to Book, and Collateral to Assets. State-level macroeconomic control variables are Log (Per Capita Income), Percentage Change in State 
GDP, State Unemployment Rate, Log (Population). Interaction variables used to correct for endogeneity issues are Below Median Book Value of Assets*Log 
(Incarceration Rate), Foreign Operations*Log (Incarceration Rate), Retail Industry*Log (Incarceration Rate), and Number of States*Log (Incarceration Rate).  
Return on Assets is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Tangible is the firm’s total net property plant and equipment divided 
by total assets. Dividend is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm issues dividends, 0 otherwise. Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of firm 
total debt. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the firm's closing stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. R&D is 
calculated as research and development expenses divided by total sales. Capital Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
Market to Book is the sum of total liabilities, preferred stock/liquidating value, deferred taxes and investment tax credit, and price times common shares 
outstanding, over total assets. Collateral to Assets is the sum of the total net property, plant, and equipment and inventory divided by total assets. 
 
We also conduct random effects regressions to determine whether these results will be consistent with our 
pooled OLS regression results. As before, our dependent variable is return on assets to measure firm 
performance. Our results from the random effects regression can be found in Table 12. We find that 
incarceration has a negative effect on firm performance. This is consistent with our pooled OLS regression 
results. 
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Table 12: Random Effects Regression clustered by firm (gvkey) Random Effects Regression clustered by firm (gvkey) 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets        
Variables Coef.   
Robust 
Standard 
Error z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log (Incarceration Rate) -0.386 ** 0.167 -2.310 0.021 -0.713 -0.059 
Log (Debt) -0.032  0.028 -1.120 0.262 -0.087 0.024 
Log (Size) 0.201 *** 0.056 3.560 0 0.090 0.311 
Tangible -0.541  0.496 -1.090 0.275 -1.513 0.431 
Dividend -0.051  0.075 -0.670 0.502 -0.198 0.097 
Research and Development 0.000  0.001 -0.800 0.422 -0.002 0.001 
Capital Expenditures 0.000  0.000 -1.080 0.278 0.000 0.000 
Market to Book Ratio -0.059 ** 0.023 -2.530 0.012 -0.105 -0.013 
Collateral to Assets -1.108 * 0.616 -1.800 0.072 -2.315 0.100 
Log (Per Capita Income) -1.416 *** 0.536 -2.640 0.008 -2.465 -0.366 
Percentage Change in State GDP 5.180 ** 2.070 2.500 0.012 1.123 9.236 
Unemployment Rate -0.010  0.032 -0.310 0.759 -0.073 0.054 
Log (Population) -0.048  0.067 -0.710 0.478 -0.180 0.084 
Below Median Book Value of Assets*Log 
(Incarceration Rate) 0.014  0.015 0.920 0.358 -0.016 0.044 
Foreign Operations*Log (Incarceration Rate) 0.016  0.011 1.510 0.131 -0.005 0.037 
Retail Industry*Log (Incarceration Rate) -0.072 *** 0.011 -6.290 0 -0.094 -0.049 
Number of States*Log (Incarceration Rate) 0.000  0.007 -0.060 0.949 -0.014 0.014 
Constant 11.159 **  4.442 2.510 0.012 2.453 19.865 
Table 9 reflects the random effects results clustered by firm and state. The dependent variable is the return on assets, the proxy variable for firm performance. 
The main independent variable is Log (Incarceration Rate). Firm control variables are Log (Debt), Log (Size), Tangible, Dividend, R & D, Capital Expenditures, 
Market to Book, and Collateral to Assets. State-level macroeconomic control variables are Log (Per Capita Income), Percentage Change in State GDP, State 
Unemployment Rate, Log (Population). Interaction variables used to correct for endogeneity issues are Below Median Book Value of Assets*Log (Incarceration 
Rate), Foreign Operations*Log (Incarceration Rate), Retail Industry*Log (Incarceration Rate), and Number of States*Log (Incarceration Rate). Return on 
Assets is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Tangible is the firm’s total net property plant and equipment divided by total 
assets. Dividend is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm issues dividends, 0 otherwise. Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of firm total 
debt. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the firm's closing stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. R&D is calculated 
as research and development expenses divided by total sales. Capital Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by total assets. Market to Book 
is the sum of total liabilities, preferred stock/liquidating value, deferred taxes and investment tax credit, and price times common shares outstanding, over total 
assets. Collateral to Assets is the sum of the total net property, plant, and equipment and inventory divided by total assets. 
 
4.7 Addressing Endogeneity 
Endogeneity in the panel data can be tackled by using GMM and the orthogonality conditions. However, 
this approach is not flawless. As the original model is expressed in levels, differencing the model may 
reduce the power of our tests by dropping variations in explanatory variables (Beck et al., 2000). Further, 
level variables may turn out to be weak instruments for first-differenced models (Arellano and Bover, 
1995). For these reasons, our paper uses the ‘system’ GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM estimation uses the first-differenced variables as 
instruments for the equations in levels in a ‘stacked’ system of equations. This stacked system of equations 
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includes both levels and difference equations. Such system GMM estimation provides efficient estimates 
by controlling time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and the dynamic relationship 
between current values of the explanatory variables and past values of the dependent variable. 
In the model used in this paper, the system GMM estimates the relationship between incarceration rate and 
firm performance by including both past performance and fixed-effects to incorporate the dynamic features 
of such a relationship and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Wintoki et al. (2012) followed a similar 
method in analyzing the relationship between governance and firm performance. The system GMM 
estimator also assumes that the correlation between endogenous variables and the unobserved (fixed) effect 
is constant over time. For this assumption, our paper includes level equations in GMM estimates and uses 
lagged differences as instruments for these levels. The difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity tests this 
assumption (Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton, 1988). The results indicate that the p-value of the 
difference-in-Hansen test is 0.488, implying the null hypothesis—that the additional instruments used in 
the system GMM are exogenous—is not rejected. 
This paper uses year dummies as strictly exogenous variables. All other explanatory variables are assumed 
to be endogenous. We use three lag variables after two years of the current year for explanatory variables 
as instruments with year dummies (t – 3, t – 4, t – 5). We take a two-year gap in the lag period to account 
for possible second-order serial correlation of residuals. The AR(2) second-order serial correlation test 
yields a p-value of 0.364, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation. This indicates that the model includes sufficient lags to control for dynamic aspects of the 
relationship between incarceration rate and firm performance. The AR(1) test reveals a p-value of 0.000 
implying that the residuals in first-differences are correlated. This validates the model specification, as such 
correlation is a requirement of system GMM model. 
Table 11 presents the two-step system GMM dynamic panel data estimates clustered by firm. Our paper 
uses year fixed assets in the estimation. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The results indicate that 
incarceration rate is again negative and significant at the 5% level, implying that incarceration negatively 
affects firm performance. The lagged firm performance is also significant at the 1% level. Log (Size) and 
the interaction term of Below Median Book Value of Assets*Log (Incarceration Rate) are positive and 
significant, which suggests that the size of the firm has a positive impact on firm performance. The 
percentage change in GDP is positive and significant, but is weaker at the 10% significance level, 
suggesting that this weakly affects firm performance (ROA). The Hansen test for over-identification 
restriction (p-value = 0.043) fails to reject the null that all instruments are valid instruments. Although we 
have used sufficient instruments and found robust standard errors, such standard errors may be weakened 
by too many instruments.  
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Table 13: Two-step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation clustered by Firm (gvkey) 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
Variable Coef.   
Robust Standard 
Error 
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Lag ROA 0.253 *** 0.056 4.53 0.000 0.144 0.363 
Log (Incarceration Rate) -2.798 ** 1.353 -2.07 0.039 -5.452 -0.144 
Log (Debt) -0.001  0.011 -0.1 0.917 -0.023 0.021 
Log (Size) 0.145 *** 0.042 3.45 0.001 0.063 0.228 
Tangible -0.321  0.368 -0.87 0.383 -1.043 0.401 
Dividend -0.006  0.063 -0.09 0.925 -0.130 0.118 
Research and Development 0.000  0.000 -0.87 0.386 0.000 0.000 
Capital Expenditure 0.000  0.000 -0.56 0.578 0.000 0.000 
Market to Book Ratio 0.005  0.004 1.15 0.252 -0.004 0.014 
Collateral to Assets 1.325  2.526 0.52 0.600 -3.627 6.278 
Log (Per Capita Income) -2.891  2.214 -1.31 0.192 -7.232 1.451 
Percentage Change in State GDP 1768.746 * 1032.321 1.71 0.087 -255.583 3793.075 
Unemployment Rate 0.031  0.034 0.91 0.365 -0.036 0.098 
Log (Population) 0.212  0.225 0.94 0.347 -0.230 0.654 
Below Median Book Value of Assets*Log 
(Incarceration Rate) 
54.161 ** 23.599 2.3 0.022 7.885 100.437 
Foreign Operations*Log (Incarceration Rate) 85.017  63.538 1.34 0.181 -39.578 209.612 
Retail Industry*Log (Incarceration Rate) 54.798  58.143 0.94 0.346 -59.217 168.813 
Number of States*Log (Incarceration Rate) 1.080   2.155 0.5 0.616 -3.146 5.307 
AR (1) test p-value       0.000 
AR (2) test p-value       0.364 
Hansen test of over-identification p-value  0.043 
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity p-value           0.488 
Table 10 reflects the Two-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel data results clustered by firm and state. The dependent variable is return on assets, the proxy 
variable for firm performance. The main independent variable is Log (Incarceration Rate). Firm control variables are Log (Debt), Log (Size), Tangible, 
Dividend, R & D, Capital Expenditures, Market to Book, and Collateral to Assets. State-level macroeconomic control variables are Log (Per Capita Income), 
Percentage Change in State GDP, State Unemployment Rate, Log (Population). Interaction variables used to correct for endogeneity issues are Below Median 
Book Value of Assets*Log (Incarceration Rate), Foreign Operations*Log (Incarceration Rate), Retail Industry*Log (Incarceration Rate), and Number of 
States*Log (Incarceration Rate). The year dummies are strictly exogenous variables only and all other explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous. 
Three lagged variables after two years of current year are taken for each explanatory variable as instruments with the year dummies to account for possible 
second-order serial correlation of residuals. Return on Assets is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Tangible is the firm’s 
total net property plant and equipment divided by total assets. Dividend is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm issues dividends, 0 
otherwise. Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of firm total debt. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the firm’s closing stock price 
multiplied by number of shares outstanding. R&D is calculated as research and development expenses divided by total sales. Capital Expenditures is calculated 
as capital expenditures divided by total assets. Market to Book is the sum of total liabilities, preferred stock/liquidating value, deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit, and price times common shares outstanding, over total assets. Collateral to Assets is the sum of the total net property, plant, and equipment and 
inventory divided by total assets. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper explores the implications that incarceration has on firm performance. Previous studies have 
examined the economic impacts of prison reform, but none have studied this phenomenon from a finance 
perspective and determined the impacts of incarceration on firms and industries. The results from our 
Granger Causality VAR and Granger Causality OLS tests indicate that there is a significant relationship 
between incarceration and unemployment in all fifty states. From this, we find that incarceration rates and 
unemployment rates are related at the state level. This finding is significant for thirty of the fifty states in 
the U.S. These results provide evidence supporting Western and Beckett (1999) that find that in the long-
run, incarceration increases unemployment.  
Through differences in means tests, we find that firms based in states with low incarceration rates 
outperform firms that are based in states with high incarceration. Through a differences in differences test, 
our results suggest that firms based in states that have undergone recent prison reform outperform firms 
based in states that have not. Controlling for firm and state-level macroeconomic variables, our findings 
indicate that incarceration has a negative impact on firm performance, measured by return on assets. This 
also holds for the four measures to control for firms that may not be affected by state-level economic factors 
in the state where they are headquartered. In addition, our results determining a negative relationship 
between incarceration and firm performance are robust through GMM estimation.  
 These findings provide supportive evidence of the negative effects of mass incarceration. Mass 
incarceration not only has an impact on the people incarcerated, their families, their communities, and the 
overall economy. It confines prisoners to a labor market that has erratic and low wage earnings which can 
make them susceptible to a cycle of a “revolving door of prison release, crime, and incarceration” 
(Bushway, Stoll, and Weiman, 2007).  
Mass incarceration also affects firms that are based in states with high levels of mass incarceration. These 
results have implications for both public and corporate policy.  Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2003a) explore 
the various barriers to entry for former prisoners. On the supply-side, they find that certain characteristics 
can limit the earnings capacities of former prisoners, which include limited experience and cognitive skills, 
limited work experience, as well as substance abuse and other physical and mental health problems. On the 
demand-side, their study finds that employers are much more hesitant to hire former prisoners as opposed 
to other disadvantaged groups, such as welfare recipients, employer interest in hiring former prisoners 
depended up their establishment characteristics and what type of job they were seeking to fill, their interest 
varied according to the type of offense the former prisoner committed as well as the work experience the 
former prisoner had since their release, employer policy to facilitate background checks has increased over 
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the past decade. All of these factors impede former prisoners to obtain employment, and several of these 
issues can be rectified through updates to both governmental and corporate policy.  
Several solutions have been proposed to reduce incarceration. Carson (2014) states that over 600,000 are 
released from prison each year. Firms such as Butterball where having issues with filling job positions and 
expanded their applicant pool and found that ex-offenders were excellent employees with lower on average 
turnover rates (Spanne, 2016). Creating ban the box corporate policies where firms ask potential employees 
about their prison records further along in the application process can enable firms access to a larger 
applicant pool as well as reduce prison populations and reduce state corrections expenditures, which is put 
onto the state taxpayer. Butterball has been such a corporate supporter of these initiatives on hiring ex-
offenders, which the firm started the 30-2-2 initiative, with the objective of 30 employers in its headquarters 
to hire at least two former prisoners and track their performance of two years to reflect that ex-offenders 
can be both desirable and competitive job candidates. This initiative is now being adopted in New Orleans 
(Lipinski, 2013). Employers take whether former prisoners have work experience after their release 
(Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2004). Providing transitional job programs can help former prisoners obtain 
employment. Corporations can participate in these programs, which will provide them a means of trial 
employment for potential job candidates.   
Incarceration reforms are being adopted to reduce prison populations. State governments have implemented 
prison reforms through policy reforms on sentencing and pretrial, prison release, community corrections, 
and prison sustainability (such as establishing oversight councils, requiring fiscal impact statements, and 
requiring data collection)12. Entrepreneurship initiatives and organizations are being adopted to provide 
prisoners with the skills to start their own businesses. In addition, tax incentives are offered to firms that 
hire staff that was previously incarcerated. Firm managers may want to explore participating in prison 
training programs and hiring employees that were previously incarcerated to help reduce prisoner 
recidivism and prison populations.  
6 Future Research 
For future research, we will conduct a further examination of the regulations restricting employment for 
ex-offenders as provided by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section data in order to 
determine the nature of each regulation, how it restricts employment, and which industries it affects.  
                                                          
12 The Pew Charitable Trusts, “33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice 
Reinvestment,” http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ 
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Appendix: Definition of Variables for Chapter 2 
Data Descriptions for Variables for Chapter 2 
Variable Definition Database 
Incarceration Variables  
Log (Incarceration Rate) The natural log of the incarceration rate.  
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics; 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Incarceration Rate 
The ratio of total custody over the state 
population.  
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics; 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Total Custody 
The sum of the total men in custody and total 
women in custody variables in the data from 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 
   
Firm-control Variables  
Total Debt 
Total debt is used as a control variable and is 
the firm’s total debt.  
Compustat 
Collateral to Assets 
The sum of the total net property, plant, and 
equipment and inventory divided by total assets 
(Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). 
Compustat 
Dividend 
A dummy variable used to distinguish firms 
that issue dividends. 1 if firms issue dividends, 
0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Return on Assets 
The dependent variable measuring firm 
performance and is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets 
(Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). 
Compustat 
Tangibility 
Tangibility is a control variable and is a ratio 
calculated by fixed assets divided by book 
assets (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). 
Compustat 
Capital Expenditure 
Capital expenditure is used as a control 
variable and is a ratio calculated by dividing 
capital expenditure by book assets (Strebulaev 
and Yang, 2013). 
Compustat 
Size 
Ln (Total Assets) is used as a control variable 
for size and is the natural log of total assets.  
Compustat 
   
The construction of the firm-control variables was referenced from Strebulaev, and Yang (2013) and then were created 
using Compustat firm financial data. Creation of indicator variables was referenced from Brushwood et al. (2017). 
Construction of the state-macroeconomic and indicator variables was referenced from Brushwood et al. (2017).  
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Data Descriptions for Variables for Chapter 2 
Variable Definition Database 
State- Macroeconomic Variables  
Log (Per Capita Income) The natural log of the state per capita income.  
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Percentage change in GDP 
The percentage change of the state gross 
domestic product (GDP). 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Unemployment Rate The state unemployment rate. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Log (Population) The natural log of the state population. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Population The state population.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
   
Indicator Variables   
Below Median 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
a firm’s book value of assets is below the 
median value within its 3-digit SIC industry, 0 
otherwise. The rationale for this is that smaller 
firms tend to have localized operations. 
Compustat 
Foreign Operations 
Whether a firm has foreign operations. This 
takes the value of 1 if a firm reports zero or 
missing foreign income and foreign taxes, and 
0 otherwise. 
EDGAR, Dyreng, and Markle (2016) 
Retail Industry 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
a firm is in the retail industry and 0 otherwise. 
The rationale for this is that retailers tend to 
have more diversified geographic operations. 
Compustat 
Number of States 
The number of different states mentioned in a 
firm’s 10-K filing. To find this, we use 
subsidiary data provided by Dyreng and Markle 
(2016) 
EDGAR, Dyreng, and Markle (2016) 
The construction of the firm-control variables was referenced from Strebulaev, and Yang (2013) and they were created 
using Compustat firm financial data. Creation of indicator variables was referenced from Brushwood et al. (2017). 
Construction of the state-macroeconomic and indicator variables was referenced from Brushwood et al. (2017).  
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